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The post-communist transition to social health insurance 
in many of the Central and Eastern European and 
Central Asian countries provides a unique opportunity to 
try to answer some of the unresolved issues in the debate 
over the relative merits of social health insurance and tax-
financed health systems. This paper employs a regression-
based generalization of the difference-in-differences 
method and instrumental variables on panel data from 
28 countries for the period 1990-2004. The authors find 
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that, controlling for any concurrent provider payment 
reforms, adoption of social health insurance increased 
national health spending and hospital activity rates, but 
did not lead to better health outcomes. The authors also 
find that adoption of social health insurance reduced 
employment in the economy as a whole and increased 
unemployment, although it did not apparently increase 
the size of the informal economy. 
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1.  Introduction 
Ninety percent of the OECD countries finance the majority of their health expenditures 
publicly (the exceptions are Mexico and the United States). The OECD is split roughly equally 
into tax-financed systems and social health insurance (SHI) systems: in half of the 30 countries, 
SHI contributions make up a majority of general government spending on health. In the rest of 
the world, the fraction of countries financing the majority of their health spending publicly is 
smaller (56% compared to 70% in the OECD), and only 21% finance the majority of their 
government spending through SHI.
1  
The relative merits of SHI and tax finance is an old debate, but one where the evidence is 
surprisingly thin. There is fairly clear evidence that payments for health care are more 
progressive or less regressive in tax-financed systems than in SHI systems.
2 It is also clear that 
tax-financed systems are more successful at ensuring universal coverage within a single health 
system; SHI systems, by contrast, typically struggle to cover the informal sector and the poor.
3 
But the presumption that those not covered by a SHI scheme fare less well—in terms of the 
quantity and quality of care they receive, the amount they pay for it out-of-pocket if they get it, 
or both—is not always borne out by the limited evidence available.
4  
                                                 
1  The figures in this paragraph are calculated from data in the World Health Report annexes.  
2  Wagstaff et al. (1992; 1999) find that SHI is less progressive than tax-financed systems (in fact, is mostly 
regressive) in the OECD countries. O’Donnell et al. (2007) find the same in Asia.  
3  Carrin and James (2004) document the time it took several of the SHI countries to achieve universal coverage. 
Baeza and Packard (2006) document coverage in several Latin American countries. Wagstaff (2007) includes 
coverage statistics for several countries, as well as for different groups.  
4  Being in a SHI scheme is typically found to be associated with higher rates of utilization, but not always lower 
levels of out-of-pocket spending or a lower risk of especially large out-of-pocket payments—see e.g. Gertler  and 
Solon (2000), Waters, Anderson and Mays (2004), and Wagstaff and Lindelow (2005).    2
Important as these issues relating to payments, coverage and utilization among 
subpopulations are, they are not the focus of this paper. Rather the focus is on the relative merits 
of SHI and tax-financed systems at the population level. Here too the evidence is thin. There is 
little systematic evidence on whether SHI systems tend to spend more on health care, and if so 
whether this translates into superior health outcomes. There are those who argue that SHI 
enables higher levels of health spending. The population may, it is argued, be more willing to 
pay SHI contributions than (other) taxes because the revenues are earmarked for health services 
and contributions confer entitlements to use them. There are those too who argue that SHI 
systems are more efficient at transforming money into health, because they more easily permit a 
separation between the purchasing of health care (done by a SHI agency kept on its toes by the 
contributors) and the provision of health care (which could be done by either government or 
private providers).  
The evidence on these points is virtually nonexistent and there are counterarguments. 
Contributions are linked to earnings through a formula and typically subject to ceilings that may 
change infrequently, with the result that at times of rapid growth SHI revenues may not keep 
pace with per capita incomes and a tax-financed system might produce higher revenue growth.
5 
Some governments have reduced their tax-financed health spending as SHI contributions have 
increased, raising the suspicion that total government spending on health may not increase 
following SHI adoption.
6  Evasion in SHI schemes has proved a major problem
7, so if the 
treasury bases its tax-financed spending on theoretical contributions, total government spending 
on health may actually fall following SHI adoption. Some SHI agencies have become corrupt 
and unresponsive to their contributors, selecting providers through cronyism rather than through 
                                                 
5  See, for example, Lu and Hsiao (2003) on Taiwan’s experience in this regard.  
6  See, for example, Twigg (1999) on Russia’s experience.  
7  See, for example, Escobar and Panopolou (2003) on Colombia, and Twigg (1999) on Russia.    3
transparent and competitive contracts.
8  SHI agencies may be more prone to “capture” by 
provider interest groups who may secure better terms (including higher wages) for providers. 
One suspects that SHI systems are also likely to be administratively expensive, often requiring 
revenue-collection efforts separate from those of the tax authorities, a contracting apparatus, and 
where multiple SHI schemes exist alongside one another a loss of monopsony power. It is not 
implausible that SHI systems spend less and are less successful at translating money into better 
health. But even on these counterarguments, the evidence is at best anecdotal.  
It is not just with respect to the health sector that there is a lack of evidence on the merits 
and demerits of SHI and tax-financed health systems. The same is true of their consequences for 
labor markets. Some of the “old” SHI countries—notably France, Germany and the 
Netherlands—have recently been reducing or are trying to reduce their reliance on payroll 
financing
9, in part out of a belief that it has contributed to unemployment and informalization of 
the labor market. These issues have also been debated in Latin America.
10 Yet there is really 
very little direct evidence on this issue, most taking the form of indirect evidence from studies of 
the employment effects of payroll taxes.
11 This indirect evidence, however, refers to all payroll 
taxes which is problematic as the impacts on labor supply may be different between, say, 
                                                 
8  A World Bank report in the late 1990s on health insurance in Argentina (World Bank 1997), commenting on the 
purchasing capacity of health insurers, argued that “it is acknowledged by Argentines that personal connections and 
corrupt practices, instead of quality and economy, weigh heavily in the award of capitated contracts and other 
payments to medical providers and suppliers, and this adds substantially to the inefficiency and high cost of health 
care in Argentina” (p.7).  
9  France widened the tax base from earnings to include nonwage income. Germany is contemplating reducing the 
emphasis on the payroll, while the Netherlands in 2005 introduced a reform where insurers receive only half their 
income from payroll revenues (albeit channeled through a central fund), the rest coming from flat-rate direct 
contributions from members (with offsetting income supplements for low income groups) (Gottret and Schieber 
2006; International Network on Health Policy & Reform 2006).  
10  See Baeza and Packard (2006) on this.  
11  Kugler and Kugler (2003) have estimated the impact of payroll tax increases in Colombia that were implemented 
in parallel with the health financing reforms. According to their estimates, the health financing reforms, which raised 
the payroll tax rate by 5 percentage points, would have reduced wages by between 0.7% and 1.1%, and employment 
by between 2% and 2.5%. By contrast, Bauer and Riphahn (2002) find that Germany’s payroll tax has had very 
limited employment effects.    4
pensions and health services, especially in poorer countries, since people may think it more 
likely they will benefit from the health services they get to use from SHI contributions than the 
pensions they may never enjoy resulting from pension contributions because they fear they will 
not live long enough. Moreover, studies of the labor market consequences of payroll tax changes 
do not answer the question of what happens to employment and informality when smaller (or 
larger) payroll taxes are replaced by larger (or smaller) other taxes. 
Getting at relative merits and demerits of SHI and tax-financed health systems through a 
cross-country econometric analysis where some systems are financed through SHI contributions 
and others are financed through general revenues is clearly problematic because there are likely 
to be unobservable variables that are correlated with both the type of financing system in place 
and the outcomes of interest (i.e. SHI is potentially endogenous). A potentially more promising 
strategy would be to look for changes in the way countries finance their health care, exploiting 
the variations in changes across countries to eliminate (time-invariant) unobservable variables. 
The difficulty with this approach is that in the group of countries that have the best data (the 
OECD), there have been very few switches between the SHI and tax-financed camps (six “old” 
OECD countries abandoned SHI in the 1970s and 1980s, notably Denmark, Greece, Iceland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain) and the transitions occurred some time ago, so the data available are 
very limited.  
This paper looks instead to a (mostly) different group of countries where transitions have 
occurred with greater frequency and more recently, namely the countries of (central and eastern) 
Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Of the 28 countries that are part of the World Bank’s ECA 
region, 14 abandoned tax-finance and adopted SHI at some stage between 1990 and 2004 (and 4 
other countries had adopted SHI prior to 1990). These countries provide not only an interesting   5
“experiment” from the point of view of health financing, but also are data-rich countries, having 
inherited and largely maintained the communist tradition of extensive data-gathering, and falling 
under the most data-rich regional office of the World Health Organization.
12 The ECA health 
financing experiment thus affords a valuable “laboratory” to try to answer some of the 
unanswered questions listed above.  
To get at these issues, we use a regression-based generalization of the differences-in-
differences (DD) method on panel data from the 28 ECA countries for the period 1990-2004. We 
explore different approaches to allowing for the possible endogeneity of SHI. The first is a 
simple individual-specific effects model estimated along the lines of the DD approach. This 
allows for the endogeneity of SHI insofar as the unobservables that are correlated with SHI 
adoption and with our outcomes are time-invariant. We explore two more specifications. One 
allows for a time-varying unobservable that can be correlated with SHI adoption and outcomes, 
and whose growth rate is allowed to vary from one country to the next. The other approach is 
Instrumental Variables (IV), implemented in the case of those outcomes for which the DD 
generalizations do not seem to control adequately for the possible endogeneity of SHI adoption.  
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of the SHI 
reforms in the post-communist ECA region. Section 3 outlines our methods. Section 4 describes 
our data. The empirical results for the health and labor analyses are presented in sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. Section 7 discusses the results and presents our conclusions.  
                                                 
12  The European office of the World Health Organization developed and has maintained a huge database to track 
progress towards its Health for All initiative. In addition, it is home to the European Observatory on Health Systems 
and Policies, which has produced detailed overviews of the health systems of the member countries (known as 
Health Systems in Transition (HiT) profiles), as well as a variety of volumes that discuss health systems and health 
policies in the region.     6
2.  The SHI reforms of Europe and Central Asia: a brief history  
Under communism, health care in the ECA countries was financed out of general 
revenues (and out-of-pocket payments) and delivered through a centrally-planned “Semashko” 
model consisting of a tiered system of health providers, each allocated budgets according to 
population-based norms, with health workers paid by salary.
13  In the early 1990s, as most 
countries shifted away from communism, several looked to SHI to solve several emerging 
problems.  
The most pressing one was the dramatic decline in government revenues as a share of 
GDP, caused by a variety of factors, including the growth of the private and informal sectors 
where tax compliance was lower, a shrinking of traditional tax bases such as state-owned 
enterprises, and pressures for tax cuts from a population experiencing declines in real income. 
With falling GDP and revenues falling as a share of GDP, health sectors experienced substantial 
cuts in government spending. SHI was seen, rightly or wrongly, as a way of protecting spending 
levels in the health sector, the presumption apparently being that earmarking would help ensure 
the health sector did not have to compete with other sectors in government spending allocation 
decisions, and that earnings in the economy as a whole would fall less than government revenues 
and be more stable. Providers were especially enthusiastic about SHI which they saw as a way to 
increase their salaries.  
SHI was also perceived as having other advantages vis-à-vis both the financing and 
delivery of health care. One was the perceived potential to reduce the grip of finance and health 
ministries over the finance and delivery sides of the system, the vision being that payroll tax 
                                                 
13 This section draws heavily on Langebrunner et al. (in press).    7
contributions could flow automatically to a SHI agency that would sit at arms’ length from both 
the finance and health ministry, and the agency could develop a purchasing capacity and make 
government providers more accountable for their performance, through provider payment 
reform, selective contracting, and competition between public and private sector providers for 
SHI contracts. Autonomization of providers was seen as a logical part of this process, which was 
seen as necessary for better performance and greater accountability.   
Of the 28 ECA countries, 14 introduced payroll taxes earmarked for health care at some 
stage between 1990 and 2004, and four others had already done so prior to 1990. Early SHI 
adopters in the 1990s included Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Macedonia, and Slovenia; all 
adopted SHI in the period 1990-92. Some countries adopted much later: Bulgaria, for example, 
adopted SHI as late as 1999. Often, both the employee and employer are liable, though of course 
there may be wide difference between who is legally liable for what and who ends up bearing the 
incidence of the payroll tax, the latter depending on conditions in the labor and product markets. 
Contributions are mandatory, and in exchange for them the contributing employee is entitled to 
receive health services under the terms of the SHI scheme. Groups other than formal sector 
workers usually have some coverage. Contributions are required from the self-employed in all 
SHI countries, and from pensioners in some. Other groups are financed out of general revenues, 
but often the contributions are not specified and insufficient funds are provided in respect of 
these groups, who sometimes have inferior de facto coverage.  
SHI does not always raise more than 50% of revenues, though in some countries its 
importance has increased over time and has gradually grown to 50% or more.  This is clear from 
Figure 1, which also shows the timing of the introduction of earmarked payroll taxes in different 
countries. In central and eastern Europe, SHI shares of total spending have tended to be higher,   8
and payroll tax rates have tended to be higher there as a result. In the first group of countries, 
payroll tax rates are normally between 10% and 15% of earnings, while in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union, they are less than 10%, often considerably so (Langenbrunner, Sheiman 
and Kehler in press). It is worth noting that some countries (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) 
introduced earmarked taxes for health care, but the tax base is income not earnings, so from a 
financing perspective these are not “pure” SHI systems.  
Some but not all of the SHI adopters—and, interestingly, some countries that have 
earmarked taxes other than payroll taxes—have changed not only the sources of finance but the 
way monies flow to providers.
14 SHI countries now typically have a SHI agency, but so too do 
Poland and Latvia that rely on income taxes or general revenues rather than payroll taxes. These 
are typically independent of the ministry of health and have responsibility for administering the 
SHI scheme or at least some functions, such as collecting contributions, setting or recommending 
contribution rates and ceilings, pooling contributions, etc. Where it exists, the SHI agency pays 
providers, but some funds still flow from the health ministry (allocations for capital spending, for 
example, but also sometimes other items of spending too). Where there is a SHI agency, it 
typically has explicit contracts with providers, though this has not always been the case, and has 
been common only in recent years. The contracting, however, is not always selective, although 
this too has become more common recently. Often there is no contracting with the private sector, 
and where it does occur, it is typically in primary care.  
Most SHI countries have also shifted from budgets as a way of paying hospitals (the 
biggest spenders in a health sector) to either fee-for-service (FFS) or a patient-based payment 
method (PBP), such as diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Figure 2 shows the timing of the 
                                                 
14 This paragraph relies heavily on information provided in the HiT series.    9
various hospital payment reforms, where we have used the HiTs series to classify a country’s 
predominant hospital payment method in a given year as falling into one of three categories: (i) 
fixed budgets/block grants (the prevailing method under the communist Semashko system), (ii) 
fee-for-service/payment by bed days, or (iii) patient-based systems (mainly DRG-based) (cf. 
Ellis and Miller 2008). Of the 18 countries that adopted SHI, 12 switched from the use of 
budgets, though in three cases the switch occurred with a lag. Some switched to FFS and stuck 
with it, while others switched subsequently to a PBP. A few switched immediately to PBP. 
Interestingly, some countries without payroll-based contributions also switched from budgets. 
The lag in provider payment reform, the fact that different countries opted for different payment 
methods and sometimes switched a second time after SHI adoption, and the fact that some non-
SHI countries also switched from budgets during our period all help to create an opportunity to 
see how far any impact of SHI adoption is due to the shift to payroll finance and the setting up of 
a SHI agency, rather than to provider payment reforms which could have occurred (and in some 
cases did occur) even without the adoption of SHI.  
3.  Methods 
Let yit be the outcome of interest in country i at time t, Xit be a vector of covariates 
thought to potentially influence both the outcome and the SHI adoption decision, and SHIit be a 
dummy variable taking on a value of 1 if country i has a SHI health financing system at time t. 
An obvious model to estimate is: 
(1)  it t it it i it y XS H I u θ γδ α =+ + ++,   10
where θt is a time-specific intercept, the coefficient δ gives the impact of SHI on the outcome yit, 
αi is a country-specific effect which captures time-invariant unobservables potentially correlated 
with SHI status, and uit is an idiosyncratic error term (iid over i and t). In the special case where 
the Xit are omitted, eqn (1) collapses to the traditional difference-in-differences (DD) estimator. 
Eqn (1) can be estimated as a fixed effects model, or in first differences. In the latter case, the 
estimating equation can be expressed as 
(2)  it t it it it y XS H I u ξ γδ Δ = +Δ + Δ +Δ , 
which can be consistently estimated by pooled OLS. 
Care needs to be taken to get accurate standard errors in this type of analysis. Bertrand et 
al. (2004) have shown that many outcome variables used in published policy impact analyses 
generate positive serial correlation in the uit. If ignored, and the model is estimated as a fixed-
effects specification, this positive serial correlation results in standard errors that are too small, 
and t-statistics that are too large—possibly dramatically so. In such a case, first differences may 
be preferred. Of course, if the uit in eqn (1) are serially uncorrelated, the error term in the first-
differenced version may well be subject to negative serial correlation, in which case the standard 
errors would be overestimated. An obvious strategy is to report standard errors that are robust to 
any type of serial correlation (and heteroskedasticity), whether one uses fixed effects or first 
differences. This is what we do below in all our models. The Monte Carlo results reported by 
Bertrand et al. (2004) suggest that with a sample of 28 countries the rate of rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no impact ought to be close to the right one.
15  
                                                 
15  We also experimented with (block) bootstrapped standard errors, and obtained broadly similar results.    11
Our basic framework of individual-specific effects represented by eqn (1) captures the 
possible endogeneity of SHIit to the extent that the unobservables that are correlated with both 
SHIit and yit are time-invariant. However, endogeneity of SHI adoption will still be a problem in 
our basic framework if there are time-varying unobservables correlated with both SHIit and yit. In 
this sense, an additional source of country heterogeneity can be introduced in a more general 
specification, through a  random trend model (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002):  
(3)  it t it it i i it y XS H I g t u θ γδ α =+ + ++ +, 
where gi is the country-specific trend of yit, and αi and gi are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated 
with the regressors. Eqn (3) thus allows for both time-invariant and time-varying unobservables 
that may be correlated with yit and SHIit, albeit in a way that assumes the unobservable grows 
over time in a linear fashion. One way of estimating this model is differencing eqn (3) to get 
(4)  it t it it i it y XS H I g u ξ γδ Δ=+ Δ + Δ ++ Δ, 
and using a fixed effects estimator on this differenced equation.
16 We can test eqn (3) against eqn 
(1) by testing the joint significance of the gi. Friedberg (1998) uses such a model in her analysis 
of divorce laws, and finds that allowing for state-specific trends is crucial to unearthing the 
impacts of these laws.  
An alternative way to relaxing the assumption that SHI is endogenous only insofar as it is 
correlated with the αi and gi is to find instruments for the SHI adoption decision. Suppose we 
have a set of instruments Zit and our basic model in levels: 
                                                 
16 Alternatively we could use the first differences estimator once again, this time applied to eqn (4) so as to eliminate 
gi, and estimate the resulting model by pooled OLS. However, this procedure would mean losing an additional 
period of time for estimation purposes, which is why we have opted for the fixed effects estimator in the case of the 
random trend model.    12
(5)  it it it t it e SHI X y + + + = δ γ θ  
Under the assumption that the instruments are weakly exogenous or predetermined, i.e. 
[] 0 = it ise Z E , s<t, t=1,…T, with T representing the number of time periods in the data, it is 
possible to use lags of the potentially endogenous SHI variable as instruments, in addition to 
“traditional” instruments obtained outside the model (Anderson and Hsiao 1981). If these 
instruments are valid (i.e. exogenous and strong in the sense of being highly correlated with our 
instrumented SHI dummy--assumptions which can be tested), they should control for any kind of 
endogeneity including that arising from country-specific effects and trends. Eqn (5) can then be 
consistently estimated by two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS) or using the more efficient two-step 
generalized method-of-moments (IV-GMM) estimator (cf. e.g. Cameron and Trivedi 2005). 
We implement both IV approaches in the cases of those outcomes for which the potential 
endogeneity of SHI adoption does not seem adequately controlled for by our DD-based 
specifications (on how we determine this, see below), using as instruments for SHIit in eqn (5) 
the first lag of the SHI dummy (SHIi,t-1) and an indicator for whether the country in question had 
a SHI system prior to the communist takeover in the mid-late 1940s. Although under weak 
exogeneity we could theoretically use more lags of the SHI variable as instruments, we include 
only its first lag in the instrument set due to the lack of variation over time in our SHI dummy
17, 
leading to the redundancy of additional lags and loss of degrees of freedom for overidentifying 
restrictions tests. The rationale for using the pre-communist presence of SHI arrangements as an 
instrument is that the tradition of health systems based on the Bismarck model in some ECA 
countries prior to communism may have increased the likelihood of SHI re-adoption in these 
                                                 
17 As it can be seen in Figure 3, transitions between tax-funded health systems and SHI arrangements occur only 
once in all but one of the countries in our sample, the only exception being Kazakhstan. The exact definition of what 
constitutes a SHI system for our purposes is given later.   13
countries after the transition to market economies, but that pre-communist characteristics could 
reasonably be thought to be uncorrelated with our health and labor outcomes (measured about 45 
years later) except by affecting the probability of SHI adoption. The relevance of our two 
instruments is assessed through a battery of tests, and Hansen tests are used to check the 
exogeneity of our instruments in the estimated models. Given the relatively small number of 
observations used to estimate some models, IV procedures (mainly GMM) potentially introduce 
small sample bias in the estimations; this adds to the—often sizeable—increase in standard 
errors expected when using IV methods relative to those obtained by OLS procedures. We 
therefore draw our basic empirical conclusions from the results of the DD-based models, and 
rely on the IV procedures mainly when SHI endogeneity seems to pose a problem even after 
controlling for country-specific effects and trends. 
4.  Data  
We use annual data on SHI status, health and labor market outcomes for the 28 ECA 
countries, from 1990 to 2004. Our dataset has been constructed using a variety of sources; the 
description in this section begins with our independent variable of interest, SHI status, and then 
continues for the variables included in our health and labor models, respectively. In the health 
sector models, data are generally available for most country-year combinations; fewer 
observations are available for the labor market models.
18 
                                                 
18 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the period between 1992 and 1996 has been excluded from the analysis due to 
the lack of data for many dependent variables and the complete disorganization of the health system—which 
obviously included the SHI scheme—during the war period.   14
Social health insurance status 
We define our SHI dummy SHIit as taking a value of one if in country i at time t 
earmarked payroll taxes for health care were collected from formal-sector workers and there was 
a SHI agency in place. The required information was obtained mainly from the Health Systems in 
Transition (HiT) document series published by the European Observatory on Health Systems and 
Policies, a partnership between the European Office of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and governmental, national and international agencies. World Bank reports and consultations 
with its staff working in the ECA region were also used in order to obtain data on countries for 
which HiTs have not yet been published, and to double-check the information assembled through 
the HiTs.
19  
Our derivation of the SHI status indicator is shown in Table 1. Our strict definition means 
that we end up classifying as non-SHI some country-year combinations that are often—we 
believe, erroneously—classified as SHI (such as Latvia and Poland). Furthermore, we classify 
Romania as SHI only after 1998; despite the fact that payroll taxes were used somewhat before 
then, it was not until 1998 that SHI was fully set up with a SHI agency and with payroll 
contributions making up the majority of health care revenues. We explore the sensitivity of our 
results to not classifying these as SHI countries, by re-running our models with the three of them 
classified as SHI for the years indicated in Table 1. 
                                                 
19 Our classification is consistent with the evidence presented in Langenbrunner et al. (in press) which came to our 
attention after the empirical work for the paper hade been completed.    15
Figure 3 depicts the pattern of SHI adoption over time in the countries of our sample. Our SHI 
status dummy is equal to 1 in about half (218 observations) of the 442 country-year 
combinations for which we have non-missing values of the indicator. 
Health sector outcome variables  
Our health sector outcome measures include: per capita health spending (total, public and 
private) and the share of spending going on salaries; population health status; hospital activity 
rates and capacity utilization; and quality-of-care indicators. Our variable definitions and sources 
are briefly described below and the descriptive statistics for them—for the full sample and 
disaggregated by SHI status—are presented in Table 2.
20  
We measure per capita health spending as total health care expenditures per capita 
expressed in constant 2000 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity (deflated using the 
United States GDP deflator), to allow comparisons in real values between countries and over 
time (Gerdtham and Jonsson 1992). The source for these figures is the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WB-WDI) database. The WB-WDI database is the primary World Bank 
database for development data, obtained from recognized international sources. It contains an 
expanded set of the economic, health and other time series indicators published in the Bank’s 
World Development Reports. Average health spending for the period 1990-2004 was US$403 
PPP per capita. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia are the countries with highest 
spending levels (each with an average of at least US$857 PPP per capita between 1990-2004 and 
at least US$1,225 PPP per capita in the last year), whereas Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have the lowest spending levels in our sample (at most US$132 PPP 
                                                 
20 The complete list of definitions and sources for our health sector outcome variables can be found in Table 9 in the 
Appendix.   16
per capita on average for 1990-2004 and US$163 PPP per capita in the last year). On average, 
government health spending accounted for almost 70% of a country’s total health spending over 
the period of analysis and 60% in the year 2003; Armenia and Tajikistan exhibited the smallest 
shares of government health spending in 2003—less than 21%—whilst in Czech Republic and 
Slovak Republic that share was higher than 88% in the same year. 
We also include among our indicators health sector salaries as a percent of total health 
spending. Data on this—like the data on many of the remaining health sector outcome 
indicators—are taken from the World Health Organization’s Health for All Database (WHO-
HFA). This database, maintained by the European Office (Copenhagen) of the WHO, contains 
data for all European countries plus the former USSR republics in Central Asia on about 600 
health indicators, including annual information on morbidity and disability; hospital discharges; 
and health care resources, utilization and expenditure. The original sources of information are 
mainly own WHO estimates, country statistical offices and other international organizations. 
Given the general scarcity of available health information for developing countries, the 
availability of this database is good news for researchers dealing with health-related issues 
specifically in the former communist countries of Europe and Central Asia. In our attempt of 
getting a comprehensive, general picture of the (potential) SHI impact on population health 
conditions, we include dependent variables related to life expectancy, group-specific mortality 
rates, disease-specific standardized death rates and incidence rates and measures of utilization of 
services such as caesarean sections and immunization. We used the same database for obtaining 
data on hospital indicators, which include measures of average length of stay, bed occupancy, 
number of hospital beds (from the WB-WDI database), admissions and disease-specific 
discharges. We also include in our analysis a few indicators of avoidable deaths—such as   17
standardized death rates for appendicitis and hernia and intestinal obstruction—as proxies for the 
average quality of hospital care. Finally, alternative infant mortality and under-five mortality 
rates were obtained from WB-WDI and the TransMONEE 2006 Database, a UNICEF IRC 
(Florence) database which contains data for ECA countries except Turkey on 146 economic and 
social indicators divided into ten different topics and ranging from 1989 to 2004.  
Simple comparisons of the average outcomes presented in Table 2 indicate that SHI 
countries tend to spend more in health care, both in the public and private sectors, and a higher 
fraction of the government health spending seems to be absorbed by salaries. On the other hand, 
there is some indication that mortality and disease incidence rates are generally lower in SHI 
countries, whilst no clear pattern emerges for immunization rates. As far as hospital indicators 
are concerned, total length of stay, in-patient admissions and beds tend all to be lower in SHI 
countries; most of our diagnosis-specific hospital discharges indicators are higher for SHI 
countries, and there is no clear pattern concerning our quality-of-care proxy measures. Visual 
comparisons of the evolution of SHI adoption in our sample vis-à-vis two health outcomes, 
average total health expenditures per capita and WHO’s average infant mortality rate (Figure 4 
and Figure 5), show somewhat clear patterns: average health spending slightly decreased during 
the first period of growing SHI adoption by ECA countries (1990-93) but experienced a 
sustained increase during and after the second period of SHI growth (1995-98, when SHI 
prevalence reached more than 50%), while the average infant mortality rate tended to remain 
stable around 22 per thousand births during the first period but continuously decreased during 
and after the second period, when SHI prevalence reached half of the countries. Determining 
whether the differences and patterns described above are due to SHI adoption (that is, a causal 
effect) or whether they merely reflect pre-existing differences—observable and/or   18
unobservable—between countries that eventually adopted SHI and those that did not (a selection 
effect) is the main task of our empirical work.
21 
Labor market outcome indicators  
Our labor models are estimated with gross wages, unemployment, employment and 
informality measures as dependent variables. We briefly describe their definitions and sources 
below, and their descriptive statistics are presented in Table 3.
22  
Total annual gross wages and salaries in local currency units were drawn from the WB-
WDI ECA regional database and transformed into yearly constant PPP averages for the 
employed population aged 15-59 using purchasing power parity conversion factors and the US 
deflator, both available at the WB-WDI database as well. We use annual data on total 
unemployment and registered unemployment rates obtained from the Key Indicators of the Labor 
Market (KILM) database, published by the International Labor Organization (ILO). The same 
database is used for gathering data on agricultural employment and self-employment as shares of 
total employment; these work categories serve as proxies for informal employment, as they have 
been argued to be closely associated with last resort, low-productivity jobs in the region, thus 
masking a situation of worsening underemployment and predominant subsistence farming 
(Svejnar 1999; Alam et al. 2005). As yet another employment measure, we use two employment-
to-population ratios: the first is drawn from the ILO-KILM database, and employment-to-
population ratio for individuals aged 15-59 was obtained from the TransMONEE 2006 Database.  
                                                 
21 Moreover, the comparisons of descriptive statistics between SHI and non-SHI countries presented in Table 2 
cannot be strictly interpreted as a preliminary assessment of SHI effects, because eventual SHI adoptions occurred 
on a staggered basis in our sample.  
22 Table 10 in the Appendix contains the full definitions and sources for all our labor outcome variables.   19
Data on informal employment or the size of the informal economy are not readily 
available for transition countries. Although there are rough estimates provided by ILO and some 
national statistical offices, their reliability and comparability across countries is not guaranteed 
and they are available for only a few countries in our sample. However, there have been some 
attempts in the literature to estimate at least the size of the informal economy using indirect 
approaches, focusing on various macroeconomic and institutional indicators which are argued to 
be linked with the evolution of the informal sector. We follow the approach proposed by 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. (1997) and measure the size of the informal 
economy by comparing official measures of annual GDP growth with total electricity 
consumption growth. The basic assumption is that electricity consumption is closely related to 
overall economic activity, with a short-run electricity-GDP usually close to one; hence, the 
annual growth in electricity consumption represents a good proxy for the total (formal plus 
informal) GDP growth in a given year. If this is the case, rough estimates of the informal GDP 
can be obtained simply by calculating the difference between the estimated total GDP and the 
official GDP measure. This simple calculation method avoids important the endogeneity 
problems likely to be found in estimates coming from modeling approaches which derive the size 
of the informal economy from economic and institutional variables.  
The method is not free from criticisms, of course. The assumption of unitary electricity-
GDP elasticity has been criticized mainly on the grounds that (i) technical progress over time has 
made electricity use more efficient than in the past, (ii) higher electricity prices reduce electricity 
consumption per unit of output, and (iii) many informal activities are not electricity-intensive, 
such as in the services sector. For these reasons, we also follow Kaufmann and Kaliberda and 
Johnson et al. and depart from the unitary elasticity assumption, considering three different   20
groups of transition countries identified in previous related research: “energy-efficient” 
economies (Central and Eastern European countries) which are assumed to have an electricity-
GDP elasticity of 0.9 with a growing economy; “energy-neutral economies” (the Baltic 
countries), assumed to have unitary elasticity; and “energy-inefficient” economies (the rest of the 
former Soviet republics), assumed to have an elasticity of 1.15 when GDP is growing.  We use 
data on electricity output and official GDP for 17 ECA countries in order to obtain annual 
estimates of the size of the informal economy for the period 1990-2003. As baseline data, we use 
the same values as Johnson et al. (1997) for the initial (i.e. 1989) shares of the informal sector in 
those countries. 
In our sample, average gross wages tended to be higher in SHI countries than in non-SHI 
countries between 1990 and 2004; Armenia and Tajikistan exhibited the lowest averages in 2004 
(less than US$150 PPP) while Croatia and Lithuania presented the highest averages in the same 
year (more than US$2,500 PPP). Average total unemployment rates seem to have been very 
similar for SHI and non-SHI countries during 1990-2004, with Hungary and Slovenia presenting 
rates around 6% in 2004, and Macedonia and Poland reaching at least 19% in the same year. 
Registered unemployment rates and employment-to-population ratios for individuals aged 15-59 
indicate a somewhat worse employment situation for SHI adopters in such period. Self-
employment and agricultural employment were lower on average for SHI countries; and both 
groups of countries presented very similar estimates for the average size of the informal 
economy: the Czech Republic and Slovakia exhibited averages lower than 16% in 2003, in 
contrast to averages higher than 41% for Azerbaijan and Georgia in that year. For two selected 
labor variables, unemployment rate and size of the informal economy, there seems to be a close, 
positive relationship between the rates of SHI adoption over time and their cross-country yearly   21
average values in the sample, as depicted in Figure 6 and Figure 7. As in the health sector case, 
however, one needs to control for the observable and unobservable heterogeneity between non-
adopters and eventual SHI adopters in order to attribute the differences and patterns identified 
above to SHI adoption.  
Covariates in the estimating equation (the X-vector) 
We are not attempting to estimate a complete model of our health sector and labor market 
outcomes, but rather to estimate the impact of SHI adoption. The criterion for including a 
variable in our Xit vector is whether its omission would bias our estimate of δ, our SHI impact 
parameter. We want to include in Xit therefore variables that are correlated with both our 
outcomes and SHI adoption.  
Although evidence on the determinants of SHI adoption is scarce, it has been indicated 
that SHI schemes emerged first in countries with higher initial (i.e. pre-transition) per capita 
income levels, whilst tax-based funding prevailed in countries with lower initial per capita 
income (Preker, Jakab and Schneider 2002). This positive correlation between income levels and 
SHI status is also present in our data; thus, we include GDP per capita in our Xit vector
23. This is 
the only variable we include among the Xit in the labor market model; our specification is thus 
similar to that of Gruber and Hanratty (1995) in their study of the employment and wage effects 
of the introduction of tax-financed health insurance in Canada. In our main health sector 
equations, we also include among the Xit the share of the population aged 65 or above, and the 
urban population as a fraction of the total. We subsequently present additional results where we 
include among the Xit dummies capturing the provider payment methods in force.  
                                                 
23 The precise definition and source are indicated, along with those for other variables included in the Xit vector, in 
Table 11 in the Appendix.   22
Preliminary data analysis: the ‘parallel trends’ assumption 
For all the generalizations of the DD approach discussed in the methods section, we will 
obtain unbiased estimates of SHI impacts only insofar the crucial “parallel trends” identifying 
assumption holds in our data, that is, only if the change in outcomes in non-SHI “control” 
countries constitutes an adequate representation of what the change in outcomes in SHI 
“treatment” countries would have been in the absence of SHI adoption. We obtain evidence that 
the (directly untestable) “parallel trends” assumption cannot be discarded to hold in our context 
through two alternative procedures.  Firstly, we performed t-tests for both (i) baseline differences 
in average outcomes—year 1990—between eventual SHI countries and non-adopters (excluding 
from the sample countries which adopted SHI in 1990 or before) and (ii) baseline differences in 
average changes in outcomes (1990-1991) between the same groups of countries (excluding 
countries which adopted SHI in 1991 or before). The first test shows statistically significant 
differences between baseline outcomes only in a few cases, and trend differences (1990-91) 
occurred in even fewer cases—only four instances, namely for overall and male life expectancy, 
and death rates by all causes and female breast cancer. 
Secondly, we ran “placebo” DD as a checking strategy: we created a false treatment 
dummy variable which took on the value of one for eventual SHI adopters in the sample and zero 
for countries that never adopted SHI, and used only 1990-1991 data (excluding countries that 
adopted SHI in 1991 or before) for performing a DD regression comparing years 1991 and 1990. 
Since there was in fact no “treatment” (SHI adoption) in either year, rejecting the null hypothesis 
of individual insignificance of the false treatment variable for changes in a given outcome—
conditional on covariates—casts doubt on the unbiasedness of estimates obtained by DD 
methods for that variable. These “placebo” regressions showed significant effects for only 9   23
health outcomes and 1 labor outcome.
24  Taken together, the results obtained by the two 
alternative exploratory procedures offer support to the assumption of “parallel trends” between 
SHI and non-SHI countries for the vast majority of health and labor outcomes; however, these 
tests are of indicative nature only, due to the small sample sizes used as a result of restricting the 
analysis to years 1990 and 1991. An additional test for endogeneity in the context of our models 
based on DD generalizations is performed in the next section. 
5.  Results: health sector outcomes 
We first report the results for the impact of SHI on health sector outcomes. For both our 
health and labor analyses, we first jointly present the estimation results for the SHI dummy 
models with country-specific effects only (eqn (2) estimated by OLS) and under the random 
trend specification, i.e. with both country-specific effects and trends (eqn (4) estimated by fixed 
effects). Next, we test for the possible endogeneity of the SHI status variable in the context of 
our more general DD-based specification—the random trend model—for the case of each 
outcome; for those cases where SHI appears to be endogenous even after country-specific effects 
and trends are taken into account, we then present the results obtained by implementing our IV 
strategy on the model in levels given by eqn (5).  
Results for the models based on generalizations of the DD approach  
Table 4 presents the results for both the SHI dummy specification with country-specific 
effects only and for the random trend specification. For only 12 of the 71 outcome indicators 
                                                 
24 The false treatment dummy had a significant positive effect (at a 10% level) on neonatal mortality rate and 
measles incidence, and negative effects on the share of government health spending absorbed by salaries, 
postneonatal mortality rate, death rates by diarrhoea, liver diseases and smoking-related causes, syphilis incidence 
and mumps immunization rate. In the labor models, a 10% significant effect (negative) was found only for 
TransMONEE’s employment-to-population ratio.     24
included in Table 4 is there any evidence of a significant impact of SHI. This itself is 
noteworthy—the impacts of SHI are limited to just a few health sector outcome variables. 
Overall, the results obtained by using our random trend model are similar to those 
obtained through the specification with country-specific effects only, both in terms of the sizes 
and significance levels of individual coefficients. However, country-specific trends seem to be 
important in explaining the evolution of health outcomes. We estimated our random trend 
specification using a least-squares dummy variables approach and tested the joint insignificance 
of the gi terms in eqn (4) through F-tests; according to the results (not shown), the joint 
insignificance of the gi terms is strongly rejected in all models, with p-values smaller than 
0.0001. For this reason, we consider the more general random trend specification to be preferred 
to our simplest model without country-specific trends, even though the results coming from both 
models lead generally to the same conclusions.
25  
Table 4 suggests that SHI has significantly raised per capita health spending, by about 
12% or US$47 PPP in 2000 prices. The increase in government health expenditures per capita—
of about 15% or US$45 PPP—seems to have accounted for almost the entire raise in total 
spending during the period, with no significant effects found on private health expenditures. The 
impacts on total and government health spending are reduced to about 8% and 12% 
(respectively) when we switch to the alternative “non-classical” definition of SHI for Latvia, 
Poland and Romania, where we classify the first two countries as SHI countries despite the fact 
they do not meet the strict definition of SHI, and Romania as SHI from 1992 onwards even 
though it was not until 1998 that Romania set up a formal mandatory SHI system. This reduction 
                                                 
25 Since the random trend specification is estimated using a fixed effects estimator, which gives consistent parameter 
estimates even if the regressors are correlated with the individual effects, using this model allows us also to control 
for the potential correlation between SHI adoption and country-specific (linear) trends in health outcomes.   25
of impact when the definition is changed provides additional evidence that SHI—interpreted 
strictly—does indeed increase health spending.
26  
Whether the additional spending resulting from a transition to SHI is a good or bad thing 
cannot be said without seeing what the extra resources buy. A second result that emerges from 
Table 4 is that SHI has significantly increased the share of health spending going on wages and 
salaries, with the mean impact being of the order of around 16%, equivalent to a mean increase 
in the share of spending going on wages and salaries of around 6 percentage points. We must 
interpret the latter result with caution, however, due to the reduced number of changes in our SHI 
dummy used to identify the parameters of the random trend-fixed effects specification in this 
case. 
The transition to SHI has not been associated with statistically significant improvements 
in health outcomes. The one exception is the 8% reduction in post-neonatal mortality, although 
there is a contradictory positive and significant impact of about 9% in one of the infant mortality 
rate measures. Nevertheless, according to the estimates for the vast majority of our indicators, 
SHI adoption does not seem to have caused either general improvements or adverse effects on 
population health status. 
Our results also point to SHI impacting on hospital activity rates, capacity utilization and 
the quality of care. Table 4 suggests that SHI reduced average total length of stay and increased 
the bed occupancy rate. However, the impacts are small in magnitude, between 2-3% over the 
sample average. We also find significant increases on in-patient admissions both overall and in 
                                                 
26 Similarly, for all the remaining models estimated in this paper, using the alternative definition of the SHI variable 
does not alter our qualitative results and only marginally affects the size of our parameter estimates in some 
instances.    26
acute care hospitals of about 2% and 4%, respectively. There is evidence of a significant positive 
impact on discharges for patients treated for cerebrovascular diseases (an increase of around 
4%), but only weak evidence of an impact on discharges by infectious diseases (11% increase in 
the model without random trend). Finally, we find evidence of a sharp reduction in the surgical 
infection rates due to SHI adoption, but again the reduced number of switches of the SHI dummy 
in the sub-sample used to estimate this model suggests caution in interpreting such result as a 
strong indication of improved hospital care quality under SHI systems. 
Endogeneity of SHI vis-à-vis health sector outcomes 
Our estimation method allows for time-invariant unobservables and time-varying 
unobservables (albeit ones that follow a linear trend) to be correlated with both our health sector 
outcomes and SHI adoption. It might, however, be argued that this does not properly capture the 
possible endogeneity of SHI. It might be that SHI was adopted precisely in response to changes 
in one or other of our health sector outcomes—falling health spending or rising mortality, for 
example. An informal yet very informative test of reverse causality proposed by Gruber and 
Hanratty (1995) in a similar modeling exercise is to include in the model a lead dummy variable 
indicating whether SHI will be adopted the following year. If causality goes from SHI to the 
outcome variable, the coefficient on the lead dummy will be zero. A nonzero coefficient would 
point towards causality running the other way or some other type of endogeneity that cannot be 
captured by eqn (3). 
We adopted this approach in the SHI dummy random trend model for all the health 
outcomes. The coefficient on the lead dummy turned out to be significant at the 10% level in 
only two of the 71 models, namely those for measles immunization rate and length of stay in 
acute care hospitals, and none was significant at the 1% level. For most outcomes, the   27
insignificance of the lead SHI dummy could not be rejected with fairly high associated p-values. 
The inclusion of country-specific effects and trends seems therefore to control for the potential 
reverse causality between health outcomes and SHI adoption in our data. 
Results for the instrumental variables (IV) approach  
Since our earlier estimated impacts do not seem to be attributable to endogeneity, and 
thus we can be more confident in that we are estimating causal effects in our random trend 
specifications, we present in Table 5 the results of our IV estimations only for the two outcomes 
for which the SHI dummy appears to be endogenous in the random trend specifications—
measles immunization rate and length of stay in acute care hospitals. The model in levels given 
by eqn (5) is estimated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) and by the two-step generalized 
method-of-moments (GMM), in order to achieve a balance between the results less likely to be 
affected by small sample bias, as it is the case for the 2SLS estimates, and the results obtained by 
the more efficient GMM method. According to the results in Table 5, our two instruments—the 
SHI dummy lagged one period and our indicator for SHI existence prior to communism—have 
very good explanatory power for the values assumed by SHIit, with the joint insignificance of the 
instruments set in the first stage regressions being strongly rejected by F tests. However, it is 
only for the measles immunization rate model that Hansen’s tests of overidentifying restrictions 
cannot reject the joint null hypothesis that our two instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term and that such instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
27 Thus, based 
on our IV estimates, SHI adoption did not have any effect on this remaining immunization 
                                                 
27 For length of stay in acute care hospitals, replacing our indicator of SHI prior to communism by the second lag of 
the SHI dummy in the instruments set (thus using SHIi,t-1 and SHIi,t-2 as instruments, so we have two instruments 
again and can implement Hansen’s test) does not lead to non-rejection of the null hypothesis in a new test for 
instruments’ exogeneity. This suggests that, for this outcome, it is the use of lagged values of the SHI dummy as 
instruments based on the weak exogeneity assumption that may not be valid after all.     28
measure either, and no reliable conclusions can be drawn as far as our measure of length of stay 
in acute care hospitals is concerned.
28 
Investigating the robustness of our basic results: SHI adoption and 
embedded institutional reforms 
As noted in section 2, SHI adoption is often (though not always) associated with a change 
in the way hospitals are paid, from budgets to either FFS or PBP. From an empirical point of 
view, it might be argued that our estimates of the impacts of SHI adoption are simply picking up 
the effects of provider payment reforms rather than the impact of SHI adoption per se. For 
example, our positive impact on health spending might be argued to derive from the fact that 
many SHI adopters switched from budgets to FFS, often sticking with FFS even now. We 
investigate the possibility our results reflect concurrent shifts in provider payment methods, 
focusing on the timing of changes in hospital payment methods.
29 To do so, we modify our 
preferred random trend specification—eqn (3)—by adding to the Xit vector dummies for FFS and 
PBP (“fixed budgets/block grants” is the reference category).
30 
                                                 
28 We estimated the IV models for all our outcomes as a way of assessing the robustness of the results obtained 
through our preferred random trend specification. In broad terms, our two instruments have very good explanatory 
power concerning the SHI variable and the null of exogeneity cannot be rejected—according to Hansen’s tests—for 
the vast majority of health outcomes. The IV results (available from the authors upon request) provide general 
support to the main conclusions derived from the random trend models; for instance, positive and significant effects 
are found on total health expenditures per capita (14% or US$57 PPP) and no effects are generally found on 
mortality, incidence of diseases or immunization measures. However, as expected, fewer significant results are 
found in the IV specifications than in the random trend models due to the substantial increase in standard errors even 
when GMM is used (random trend standard errors are typically multiplied by a factor of four when IV is performed). 
Taking this IV feature into account, point estimates suggest that SHI may have had an even larger positive effect on 
the share of wages and salaries than previously estimated—of around 22%, with an associated p-value of 0.117. The 
results are inconclusive concerning length of stay and hospital admissions measures due to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis in Hansen’s tests for the validity of the instruments set. 
29 We would like to have expanded the scope of this part of the analysis to cover other potentially relevant changes 
that may have been associated with SHI adoption, such as changes to the way primary care providers were paid, the 
introduction of a gate-keeping function for primary care providers, and so on. We were unable, however, to get the 
relevant data, year by year. At best, we could obtain typically only snapshots of the initial (i.e. communist) and 
current arrangements, with no information on the timing of these changes over the decade.  
30 Table 12 in the Appendix presents the detailed timing of changes in predominant hospital payment methods for 
the countries in our sample. As it can be noticed, SHI adoption and a change in the predominant hospital payment 
method have occurred in the same year for some countries, e.g. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Kyrgyz Republic 
and Macedonia.     29
Overall, the new results presented in Table 6 offer support to our previous finding that 
SHI adoption increased per capita health spending. Even after including the payment methods 
dummies, we find that SHI led to an increase in annual government health care expenditures per 
capita of around 11% or US$33 PPP in the “adopter” countries, compared to what would have 
occurred had these countries not switched to SHI. This estimated effect is only 4 percentage 
points smaller than that obtained from our original random trend specification (i.e. without the 
payment dummies) and is significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, while the coefficients on FFS 
and PBP are the expected sign, neither is significant. The results suggest, in other words, that 
SHI adoption of itself increases government health spending, while switching from budgets to 
either FFS or PBP does not of itself change government health spending per capita. Interestingly, 
our results suggest that private spending on health is sensitive to the way hospitals are paid, with 
FFS being associated with significantly higher private spending. The magnitude is sizeable: an 
increase of 34% or US$36 PPP per capita.  
As far as health outcomes are concerned, there was little evidence in our original 
specification of SHI adoption having any impact, and this remains the case even after including 
provider payment method dummies. The latter have a few significant coefficients but there is no 
consistent pattern. As far as hospital indicators are concerned, the results in Table 6 confirm that 
quality of care as measured by surgical infection rates has markedly improved as a result of SHI 
adoption. The new estimated increase in the bed occupancy rate due to SHI is similar to the 
original estimate (3.5%). By contrast, the impact of SHI on acute care hospital admissions is 
somewhat smaller when the provider payment method dummies are included among the Xit 
(2.5% compared to 3.7%). This reduction is due to FFS having an independent positive impact 
on admissions, and the introduction of FFS being correlated with the adoption of SHI. In our new   30
results, SHI no longer has an impact on length of stay, though neither does the way hospitals are 
paid.  
Overall, our basic empirical conclusions seem fairly robust to the inclusion of changes in 
hospital payment methods as potential confounders of SHI impacts.
31 In particular, SHI adoption 
per se—i.e., without any change in payment methods—is still found to lead to higher 
government health spending, bed occupancy rates and (acute care) hospital admissions, but no 
improvements on population health indicators.
32 
6.  Results: labor market outcomes 
In this section we report our results for the impact of SHI on labor market outcomes. The 
format follows that of the previous section.  
Results for the models based on generalizations of the DD approach  
Among the eight outcomes studied, in only one case do we see a significant impact, 
namely for the average gross wage rate (Table 7).
33 The coefficient is positive and its point 
estimate is remarkably similar in the models with and without random trend; it implies an 
                                                 
31 We implemented the “lead SHI dummy” test for reverse causality in the context of this new specification as well; 
the lead SHI dummy is found to be significant at the 10% level in only four instances—measles and mumps 
immunization rates, hospital discharges by respiratory diseases and length of stay in acute care hospitals. For the 
latter outcome, our IV models (results not shown) lead to inconclusive results due to the rejection of the null 
hypothesis of instruments’ exogeneity in Hansen’s tests.    
32 The estimated coefficients on hospital payment methods are of course very interesting by themselves, not least 
because in practice it has been mostly SHI countries that have abandoned budgets as the predominant arrangement 
in our sample; however, since an analysis of the influence of provider payment methods on health indicators is not 
the primary aim of this paper, we only briefly comment on these results here. As it can be seen in Table 6, in 
addition to the substantial, positive effect of fee-for-service on total and private health care spending per capita, this 
arrangement is also found to decrease the length of stay in acute care hospitals and increase the number of inpatient 
admissions and hospital discharges, suggesting that providers are given the incentives for using resources more 
intensely under such payment method. Also noteworthy is the finding that neither fee-for-service nor SHI per se 
induce hospital downsizing in terms of the normally excessive beds supply inherited from the communist system, 
though switching from budgets to patient-based payment methods seems to provide some incentive for it. 
33 The models for labor market outcomes are estimated using the natural logarithm of the dependent variable.   31
increase of around 20% in the average gross wages and salaries after SHI adoption in a given 
country. We find no evidence in Table 7 of SHI significantly increasing unemployment or 
reducing employment; nor do we find any effects of SHI adoption on either the informal 
economy measure or our informal employment proxies (self-employment and agricultural 
employment as shares of the total). 
Endogeneity of SHI vis-à-vis labor market outcomes 
We undertook the same type of informal test for endogeneity discussed above for the 
health sector outcome variables. The coefficient on the lead SHI dummy was significant at the 
5% level for two of the outcomes: registered unemployment rate and TransMONEE’s 
employment-to-population ratio. Moreover, the coefficient for the lead SHI dummy was 
significant at the 10% level for our measure of the size of the informal economy. These results 
suggest that the statistical insignificance of at least some of the SHI impacts estimated in our 
previous models might be due to endogeneity. Therefore, in contrast to what we found for the 
health outcomes, endogeneity seems to be a reason for concern in our labor models, and we 
tackle this issue by implementing our IV methods in what follows. 
Results for the instrumental variables (IV) approach  
The results for the registered unemployment, TransMONEE’s employment-to-population 
ratio and informal economy models estimated by 2SLS and GMM are reported in Table 8.
34 As 
for the health outcomes, the two instruments used seem to be extremely relevant for all labor 
models, with partial F statistics above 250. Additional tests (not shown) confirm that our 
instruments are relevant and strong in the context of these labor models: for the three cases, 
                                                 
34 As in the random trend specification, the IV models are estimated using the natural logarithm of the dependent 
variable at the left-hand side.   32
Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio tests firmly reject the null of model 
underidentification—with associated p-values smaller than 0.001—and Cragg-Donald F-tests 
(Stock and Yogo 2002) strongly reject the null of weak instruments (F statistics above 200). 
Furthermore, according to the results of the Hansen tests for overidentifying restrictions, our 
excluded instruments are found to be exogenous for the models with the three outcomes as 
dependent variables (p-values larger than 0.47). Thus, for the three labor models where we found 
evidence of endogeneity in our random trend specification, it seems safe to base our conclusions 
entirely on the IV results, since there is evidence that the latter models provide reliable parameter 
estimates for such cases. 
Again as expected, GMM estimates are more efficient than the 2SLS ones, but even 
GMM standard errors turn out to be four times larger on average than the random trend 
estimates. Despite such large inflation in standard errors, the IV estimates provide evidence that 
the lack of significant SHI impacts found in the previous models on two employment indicators, 
the registered unemployment rate and TransMONEE’s employment-to-population ratio, was due 
to endogeneity. Positive and strongly significant impacts on registered unemployment rates are 
reported in both the 2SLS and GMM columns of Table 8, suggesting that SHI adoption doubles 
this unemployment measure. Although no effect was found on the total unemployment rate in the 
random trend models, 2SLS estimations show some evidence that SHI adoption has led to a 
deterioration of employment levels as measured by TransMONEE’s employment-to-population 
ratio: the point estimate is significant at the 10% level and implies a decrease of around 10% or 
6.7 percentage points in this indicator in response to SHI adoption. A similar point estimate, very 
close to the 10% level of statistical significance, is found in the GMM estimations. Finally, there 
is once more no evidence of a SHI impact on the size of the informal economy.    33
7.  Discussion and conclusions 
The health system reforms the European and Central Asian (ECA) countries implemented 
during their transition from socialist economies in the 1990s provide a unique opportunity to 
assess the impacts of social health insurance (SHI) on the health and labor sectors. We took 
advantage of this highly unusual “experiment” in which many ECA countries unequivocally 
switched from general tax-funded to SHI systems in a relatively short period of time, and on a 
staggered basis, so as to shed light on two broad sets of currently unanswered questions: firstly, 
how does SHI affect national health spending, the way such resources are spent, and population 
health outcomes? Secondly, how does SHI impact national employment levels and 
informalization of the economy? In order to obtain empirical evidence on these issues, we have 
used regression-based generalizations of the differences-in-differences approach and 
instrumental variables (IV) methods on panel data from 28 ECA countries for the period 1990-
2004. 
Overall, there is reliable evidence that our empirical methods have allowed us to 
successfully control for the possible endogeneity of SHI adoption, and therefore that we have 
identified causal relationships between SHI adoption and outcomes. This supporting evidence 
comes from a variety of sources. In the first place, our random trend specifications control for 
any time-invariant country-specific unobservables that may be simultaneously correlated with 
SHI adoption and outcomes, and also control for country-specific linear trends in these 
unobservables over time. Second, diagnostic checks show that we cannot rule out the validity of 
the “parallel trends” assumption for the majority of the outcomes analyzed in this paper, thus 
conferring credibility on the parameters obtained from our random trend models (which use the 
evolution of outcomes in non-SHI countries as the counterfactual for countries that adopted   34
SHI). Third, the results from an informal test for endogeneity in the random trend models 
suggest that reverse causality—that is, countries switching to SHI because of the evolution of 
their outcomes—is not present in the context of our health sector analysis. Finally, a battery of 
tests show that our IV models are well suited to the task of controlling for the potential 
endogeneity of SHI adoption identified in the random trend models for some important labor 
outcomes, thus providing reliable parameter estimates for the causal effect of SHI adoption in 
such cases.    
Our estimates suggest that SHI adoption per se increased government health expenditure 
per capita. We also obtain some evidence that part of the extra financial resources available in 
the health sector due to SHI adoption have served to increase the fraction of salaries as 
percentage of government health spending in SHI countries. This result provides quantitative 
evidence in support of claims about the process of transition to SHI in some ECA countries being 
favored and accelerated by pressure from health professionals, who expected to have their 
income levels driven up by the introduction of a SHI system.
35 Although SHI has impacted on 
how physical resources are used through a reduction in the average hospital length of stay and 
increases in hospital admissions and bed occupancy rates after SHI adoption, only one 
indicator—the surgical infection rate—suggests a (large) improvement in the quality of hospital 
care for SHI systems. Even though SHI systems ended up spending more on health care than 
their tax-funded counterparts, our analysis of several mortality and morbidity indicators showed 
that transition to SHI has not caused general improvements in health outcomes for ECA 
countries.  
                                                 
35 See, for instance, the individual WHO-HiT reports for the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation.   35
These results are mostly robust to the inclusion of dummy variables capturing shifts in 
provider payment methods alongside the SHI status dummy; they are therefore pure SHI effects. 
For example, the higher government spending caused by a transition to SHI is not a spurious 
result attributable to the fact that some countries switched to fee-for-service (FFS) when they 
adopted SHI. We are able to estimate separate provider payment effects because SHI adoption 
did not always lead to provider payment reform and even when it did sometimes did so with a 
lag, because some non-SHI countries reformed the way they paid hospitals as well, and because 
some SHI countries switched provider payment methods more than once (some, for example, 
switched to FFS only to change to a patient-based payment method (PBP) later on). Typically, 
where we find an impact of provider payments on our outcomes we do not find an impact of SHI 
adoption, and vice versa. For example, private health spending is affected (positively) by a 
switch to FFS but not by SHI adoption, while government spending is (positively) affected by 
SHI adoption but not by how hospitals are paid.  An exception is acute care admissions, which 
respond positively to both SHI adoption (a 2.5% increase) and a switch to FFS (a 3% increase). 
The impact of SHI adoption on acute care admissions was thus greater in countries where SHI 
adoption was associated with a switch to FFS than in countries where SHI adoption did not 
coincide with a provider payment reform. 
The question arises: Why did health outcomes not improve as a result of SHI adoption 
even though it led of itself to higher government health spending and higher acute in-patient 
admissions? One part of the explanation is that the percentage increase in admissions was much 
smaller than the percentage increase in spending (2.5% compared to 11%). Much of the extra 
spending therefore resulted in more costly admissions and/or extra spending elsewhere in the 
health system. Part of the story seems to be the higher salary share of costs as a result of SHI   36
adoption. But it also seems likely that costs were incurred undertaking new activities (e.g. 
collecting contributions, writing contracts with providers) or that existing activities became more 
costly (e.g. more tests being administered on in-patients, more expensive drugs being given, 
etc.). It is also possible that SHI adoption may have resulted in less comprehensive and less well 
integrated public health and prevention programs (cf. e.g. Allin et al. 2004), and that the extra 
admissions and extra costs caused by the transition to SHI were incurred in treating additional 
patients who would not have otherwise become sick. The fact that SHI adoption appears to have 
led to increased numbers of infectious disease hospital discharges (Table 6) is consistent with 
this story. Gaps in coverage may also be part of the explanation. Some groups seem to have 
fallen through the coverage net, such as the Roma population (cf. e.g. Rechel and McKee 2003), 
and there is anecdotal evidence that some formal sector workers wait to enroll until they get sick. 
Because of lack of coverage, these groups may use primary care less than they would have 
otherwise done, increasing the likelihood illness is left untreated until serious enough to warrant 
hospitalization. Some of the extra hospital caseload associated with SHI may therefore simply be 
due to people waiting until they get so sick that they require hospitalization.  
As far as the relationship between SHI adoption and the labor market is concerned, our 
work offers some empirical support to the alleged damaging effect of SHI on employment levels. 
We find that registered unemployment rates doubled in SHI countries compared to what the rates 
would have been if those countries had not adopted SHI. In spite of the sizeable magnitude of 
this effect, this result is not corroborated by a commensurate increase in total unemployment 
rates. We do, however, find corroborating evidence of a negative impact of SHI adoption on 
employment from our estimated negative impact of SHI on the employment-to-population ratio 
of people aged 15-59. SHI is also estimated to have strongly increased average gross wages and   37
salaries in the formal sector. On the other hand, transition to a SHI system did not cause an 
increase in the size of the informal sector of the ECA countries according to our—admittedly 
fallible—measures of informality. There is also no evidence that SHI adoption led to an increase 
on informal employment in SHI countries of the region.  
Of course, our results do not necessarily imply that SHI adoption everywhere must 
necessarily reduce employment, and raise health spending without improving health outcomes. 
The latter pair of results in particular is likely to hinge in part on the fact that SHI was introduced 
with costly institutional reforms but ones that did little to stimulate the performance of the health 
system. Nonetheless, the largely negative results in the paper ought to serve as a warning to those 
contemplating shifting from general revenue finance to SHI.    38
Table 1: Definitions of SHI status in the dataset 
Country 
Year of SHI 
adoption SHI  dummy  Comments 
Albania  1995  =1 1995 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Armenia Never  =0  throughout   
Azerbaijan Never  =0  throughout   
Belarus Never  =0  throughout   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  Prior to 1990  =1 for 1991 
Missing 1992-96 
=1 1997 onwards 
SHI in place prior and (in theory) 
during the to 1992-95 war, but war 
period excluded from analysis 
Bulgaria  1999  =1 1999 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Croatia  Prior to 1990  =1 1990 onwards   
Czech Republic  1993  =1 1993 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Estonia  1992  =1 1992 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Georgia  1995  =1 1995 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Hungary  1990  =1 1990 onwards   
Kazakhstan 1996  =1  1996-1998 
=0 otherwise 
Abandoned SHI in 1998 
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  =1 1997 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Latvia  Never  Option 1: =0 throughout 
Option 2: =1 1997 onwards, 0 otherwise 
Latvia set up SHI agency before 
1997 but it was funded through 
general revenues. Since 1997, 28.4% 
of income taxes are earmarked for 
health  
Lithuania  1991  =1 1991 onwards 
=0 otherwise 
 
Macedonia, FYR  1991  =1 1991 onwards 
=0 1990 
 
Moldova Never  =0  throughout   
Poland  Never  Option 1: =0 throughout 
Option 2: =1 1999 onwards, 0 otherwise 
Health system funded not through 
payroll tax but earmarked income tax 
Romania  1998  Option 1: =1 1998 onwards, 0 otherwise 
Option 2: missing 1990-91 
=1 1992 onwards 
Earmarked payroll taxes were 
established in 1992 (2% of payroll)  
Russian Federation  1993  =1 1993 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Serbia and Montenegro  Prior to 1990  =1 throughout   
Slovak Republic  1995  =1 1995 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Slovenia  1992  =1 1992 onwards 
=0 beforehand 
 
Tajikistan Never  =0  throughout   
Turkey  Prior to 1990  =1 throughout  Two out of the three main insurance 
funds collect payroll-based 
earmarked contributions for health 
and cover approximately 87% of the 
population 
Turkmenistan Never  =0  throughout  WHR has social security spending 
ranging from 6.1-9.9%.  
Ukraine Never  =0  throughout   
Uzbekistan Never  =0  throughout   
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for health sector outcome variables 
 
    Full sample  SHI = 1    SHI = 0 
    Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs    Mean SD Obs 
Health expenditures - Total    402.83 296.92  359  536.16 325.16 186   259.47 172.88  173 
Health expenditures - Government   295.87 249.61  324  404.22 281.52 167   180.62 136.89  157 
Health expenditures - Private    101.26 71.77  324  123.91 72.54 167    77.16 62.69 157 
Salaries (%)    39.41 12.63 168  40.24 16.62 69    38.82 8.95  98 
Physicians    2.97 0.93  343 2.72 1.01  158    3.20 0.79 184 
Life expectancy    70.49 2.91 380 71.52 3.03 181    69.55 2.45 198 
Life expectancy (male)    66.41 3.51 377 67.53 3.76 178    65.39 2.92 198 
Life expectancy (female)    74.64 2.65 377 75.64 2.61 178    73.73 2.36 198 
Under-5 MR (TransMONEE)    21.59 13.07 383  15.95  8.19 179    26.58 14.51 203 
Under-5 MR (WHO)    21.12 13.05 366  15.37  7.73 167    25.99 14.61 198 
Infant MR (WB)    20.22 19.66 231  13.25 11.10 127    28.95 24.25 102 
Infant MR (TransMONEE)    17.10 9.48 399 13.24 6.57 181    20.40 10.42 212 
Infant MR (WHO)    16.95 9.57 379 14.31 9.29 179    19.29 9.25 198 
Perinatal MR    12.40 4.74 352 10.91 5.25 161    13.64 3.87 191 
Neonatal MR    7.78 3.00  296 7.35 3.34  154    8.24 2.51 141 
Postneonatal MR    7.31 6.29  295 4.89 3.18  154    9.99 7.66 140 
Maternal MR    28.46 21.78 383  23.05 23.01 178    33.27 19.51 204 
Maternal MR (3-year)    28.65 18.88 349  21.94 17.12 156    34.16 18.55 192 
Caesarean sections    92.77 50.10 331 118.53  43.52 154    70.35 44.43 177 
SDR all causes   1145.92 184.92 366 1081.83 182.81 167    1200.68 169.12  198 
SDR infeccious diseases    17.16 15.31 363  11.81 10.25 167    21.77 17.37 195 
SDR tuberculosis    9.84 8.02  361 7.57 8.23  167    11.80 7.33 193 
SDR diarrhoea (under 5)    31.38 67.31 354  11.82 22.38 166    48.92 86.59 187 
SDR ARI (under 5)    105.48 145.38  342  46.61  66.83  167   162.47 175.26  174 
SDR heart disease    302.88 129.88  363  239.05 109.83 167   358.58 119.68  195 
SDR liver diseases    29.41 21.36 321  26.16 18.02 151    32.39 23.66 169 
SDR diabetes    14.92 8.59 363 14.35 6.91 167    15.39 9.81 195 
SDR circulatory diseases    623.62 125.33  363  576.83 120.03 167   664.11 115.85  195 
SDR cerebrovascular diseases    175.36 53.23  363  171.89 55.21 167    178.57 51.46  195 
SDR neoplasms    172.78 47.55  363  190.83 45.72 167    157.40 43.72  195 
SDR female breast cancer    21.58 6.68 363 24.52 5.70 167    19.11 6.46 195 
SDR respiratory diseases    68.31 34.93 363  54.13 27.91 167    80.59 35.80 195 
SDR bronchitis    30.99 19.57 350  25.36 19.93 161    35.85 17.99 188 
SDR digestive diseases    48.09 22.90 363  44.73 20.10 167    51.03 24.76 195 
SDR alcohol causes    134.83 57.24  321  123.72 57.61 155    145.75 54.78  165 
SDR smoking causes    542.38 167.07  321  466.26 131.64 155   615.31 164.40  165 
Tuberculosis incidence rate    52.88 31.90 416  50.41 33.97 201    54.98 29.76 213 
Hepatitis incidence rate    141.31 170.91  320  67.66  83.37  148   205.37 199.84  171 
Hepatitis B incidence rate    17.23 19.29 384  10.38  9.61 178    23.24 23.26 205 
Measles incidence rate    13.31 26.96 415  10.33 23.45 200    16.17 29.76 213 
Mumps incidence rate    54.72 76.49 390  37.95 58.73 182    69.63 86.83 207 
Syphilis incidence rate    31.77 52.15 381  28.21 55.82 180    35.14 48.61 200 
Congenital syph incidence rate    0.16 0.30  218 0.23 0.40 88    0.11 0.18 129 
Pertussis incidence rate    4.05 5.62  413 4.33 6.78  199    3.78 4.27 213   40
    Full sample  SHI = 1    SHI = 0 
    Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs    Mean SD Obs 
Diphteria incidence rate    1.31 5.19  415 0.67 2.94  200    1.93 6.61 213 
Tetanus incidence rate    0.09 0.11  407 0.11 0.12  196    0.07 0.09 210 
Cancer incidence rate    245.01 147.37  335  318.21 159.21 138   193.72 113.47  197 
Tuberculosis immunization rate    92.70 11.32 420  93.10 10.39 201    93.24 9.93 213 
DPT immunization rate    91.59 9.75 420 91.90 7.67 201    91.87 10.31 213 
Measles immunization rate    91.22 9.80 420 91.57 8.57 201    91.70 9.45 213 
Polio immunization rate    92.06 8.81 420 91.94 7.76 201    92.82 8.69 213 
Mumps immunization rate    82.25 22.69 227  88.63 16.39 127    74.59 26.50  99 
Rubella immunization rate    88.00 19.23 190  90.05 15.52 124    85.29 22.78  65 
Length of stay (total)    12.75 3.04 398 11.23 2.93 193    14.19 2.39 204 
Length of stay (acute care)    10.87 2.71 267  9.40  2.37 150    12.78 1.79 116 
Bed occupancy rate    72.80 14.78 278  74.85  9.82 149    70.36 18.78 128 
Hospital beds    8.10 2.91  342 6.72 2.59  155    9.28 2.64 186 
In-patient admissions    16.18 5.99 397 15.51 6.02 194    16.86 5.90 202 
Acute care admissions    15.16 5.39 277 15.17  5.5 150    15.20 5.26 126 
Hospital discharges - infectious    826.10 444.11  353  658.64 352.78 170   981.66 464.08  183 
Hosp discharges - cancers    809.34 588.59  346  1068.85 643.08 163   578.19 417.81  183 
Hosp discharges - heart    669.00 468.43  343  684.00 425.49 163   655.41 504.97  180 
Hosp discharges - circulatory   1904.45 1099.73 354 2092.45 1152.72 170    1730.76 1021.10 184 
Hosp discharges - cerebrov    339.11 240.51  350  394.82 243.94 168   287.68 226.04  182 
Hosp discharges - respiratory   2088.68 1014.24 351 1737.75 778.42  170    2418.28 1098.08 181 
Hosp discharges - digestive   1623.59 626.99 354 1544.75 579.86 170    1696.44 660.83  184 
Hosp discharges - musculo    776.92 508.15  354  809.35 536.77 170   746.96 479.71  184 
SDR appendicitis    0.30 0.18  347 0.23 0.14  158    0.36 0.19 188 
SDR hernia & intestinal    2.23 0.75  350 2.34 0.74  161    2.14 0.74 188 
SDR adverse effects    0.20 0.33  183 0.19 0.33  116    0.19 0.28 66 
Surgical infection rate    1.09 1.22 74  0.92 0.82 42    1.30 1.59 32 
Note: Mean, standard deviation (SD) and number of observations (Obs) for the full sample and for the sub-samples of 
observations with the SHI dummy equals to one (SHI=1) and zero (SHI=0).  
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Table 3: Labor market outcome variables: descriptive statistics 
 
    Full sample  SHI = 1    SHI = 0 
    Mean SD Obs  Mean SD  Obs    Mean SD  Obs 
Gross wage   1115.49 876.72  257  1555.22 921.52 119   736.31 626.16 138 
Unemployment    11.68 5.91 229  11.66 6.16  162    11.73 5.29  67 
Registered unemployment    9.27 8.26  295  12.98  9.11  141    5.87 5.56 154 
Empl-to-pop - ILO    51.39 6.31 150  51.22 5.96  110    51.86 7.25  40 
Empl-to-pop - TransMONEE    67.31 9.00 360  64.54 9.12  158    69.47 8.30  202 
Informal economy    21.82 21.07 238  22.35 19.94  93    21.49 21.82  145 
Self-employment    17.24 9.26 190  16.13 8.85  132    19.77 9.73  58 
Employment in agriculture    25.26 16.64 268  23.07 18.93  162    28.61 11.64  106 
Note: Mean, standard deviation (SD) and number of observations (Obs) for the full sample and for the sub-samples of 
observations with the SHI dummy equals to one (SHI=1) and zero (SHI=0). 
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Table 4: Basic results: health sector outcomes 
 
     
Basic model 
Eqn (2) estimated by OLS    
Random trend model 
Eqn (4) estimated by fixed effects    













Health expenditures - Total  45.87  28.07  0.114  0.113    47.47 27.70 0.098  0.117  11 
Health expenditures - Government  45.57 20.66 0.036  0.150   45.20 20.53 0.037  0.149  11 
Health expenditures - Private  0.61  13.77  0.965  0.006    2.31  12.85  0.859  0.022  11 




















Physicians  0.04 0.04  0.322  0.013  0.03 0.04  0.410  0.010  13 
Life expectancy  -0.21  0.23  0.370  -0.003     -0.24  0.22  0.297  -0.003  13 
Life expectancy (male)  -0.24  0.27  0.371  -0.004    -0.27  0.26  0.316  -0.004  13 
Life expectancy (female)  -0.15  0.16  0.374  -0.002    -0.17  0.16  0.286  -0.002  13 
Under-5  MR  (TransMONEE)  0.10  0.87 0.911 0.005  -0.12 0.89 0.896 -0.006  14 
Under-5  MR  (WHO)  0.92 0.69  0.195  0.045  0.81 0.67  0.241  0.039  13 
Infant MR (WB)  1.03 0.50  0.068  0.092  0.99 0.50  0.074  0.089  7 
Infant  MR  (TransMONEE)  0.25 0.57  0.667  0.015  0.10 0.57  0.859  0.006  14 
Infant  MR  (WHO)  0.40 0.49  0.429  0.024  0.37 0.48  0.446  0.023  14 
Perinatal  MR  0.39 0.32  0.244  0.032  0.19 0.36  0.598  0.016  13 
Neonatal  MR  0.56 0.39  0.158  0.075  0.43 0.45  0.348  0.057  10 
Postneonatal MR  -0.46 0.27 0.099  -0.065  -0.55 0.27 0.056  -0.078  10 
Maternal  MR  2.59 2.08  0.225  0.091  2.80 2.15  0.206  0.099  13 
Maternal MR (3-year)  1.31  0.99  0.198  0.045    1.46  1.11  0.199  0.050  13 
Caesarean  sections  -0.27 0.87 0.761  -0.003  -0.90 0.98 0.370  -0.009  10 
SDR all causes  5.96  20.82  0.777  0.005    9.37  20.95  0.659  0.008  13 
SDR infeccious diseases  1.38  1.79  0.447 0.078  1.45  1.87 0.446 0.082  13 
SDR  tuberculosis  1.63 1.48  0.282  0.157  1.83 1.53  0.245  0.177  13 
SDR diarrhoea (under 5)  4.09  5.24  0.442  0.134    2.74  5.52  0.625  0.089  13 
SDR ARI (under 5)  1.63  5.00  0.747  0.016    2.25  5.43  0.683  0.022  12 
SDR heart disease  -0.36  6.01  0.953  -0.001    1.93  5.66  0.735  0.006  13 
SDR  liver  diseases  -0.53 1.19 0.659  -0.017  -0.25 1.14 0.828  -0.008  10 
SDR  diabetes  0.66 1.29  0.615  0.044  0.89 1.33  0.509  0.060  13 
SDR circulatory diseases  -2.00  14.24  0.889  -0.003    1.79  14.49  0.903  0.003  13 
SDR  cerebrovascular  diseases  0.88 4.80  0.856  0.005  1.16 4.94  0.816  0.007  13 
SDR  neoplasms  2.23 2.20  0.320  0.013  2.00 2.24  0.380  0.012  13 
SDR female breast cancer  0.06  0.43  0.883  0.003    0.09  0.43  0.844  0.004  13 
SDR  respiratory  diseases  2.03 1.85  0.283  0.029  2.23 2.00  0.276  0.032  13 
SDR  bronchitis  3.68 3.47  0.300  0.118  3.62 3.67  0.334  0.116  13 
SDR digestive diseases  -0.32  1.08  0.773  -0.006    -0.06  1.03  0.953  -0.001  13 
SDR alcohol causes  -1.27  3.64  0.731  -0.009    -0.87  3.43  0.802  -0.006  11 
SDR  smoking  causes  1.65 13.69  0.905 0.003  1.02 14.20  0.943 0.002  11 
Tuberculosis  incidence  rate  -2.63 2.71 0.342  -0.048  -2.29 2.86 0.430  -0.042  14 
Hepatitis  incidence  rate  34.08 26.07 0.203  0.264   29.43 26.71 0.281  0.228  14 
Hepatitis B incidence rate  1.69  1.07  0.127  0.104    0.85  1.09  0.440  0.052  12 
Measles  incidence  rate  -5.09 7.56 0.507  -0.431  -6.53 7.55 0.395  -0.553  14 

















Syphilis  incidence  rate  7.38  9.77 0.457 0.201  7.69 10.58  0.474 0.209  14   43
     
Basic model 
Eqn (2) estimated by OLS    
Random trend model 
Eqn (4) estimated by fixed effects    













Congenital syph incidence rate  -0.01  0.02  0.704  -0.053    -0.02  0.03  0.482  -0.109  7 
Pertussis  incidence  rate  1.05 1.06  0.333  0.258  0.95 1.11  0.402  0.234  14 
Diphteria  incidence  rate  -0.05 0.68 0.936  -0.037  -0.13 0.70 0.850  -0.089  14 
Tetanus  incidence  rate  0.02 0.02  0.287  0.208  0.02 0.02  0.264  0.219  14 
Cancer incidence rate  2.37  3.06  0.447  0.010    -0.02  3.10  0.994  0.000  14 
Tuberculosis immunization rate  0.92  1.41  0.520  0.010    0.84  1.42  0.559  0.009  14 
DPT  immunization  rate  -0.40 1.17 0.738  -0.004  -0.25 1.27 0.846  -0.003  14 
Measles  immunization  rate  -0.24 0.55 0.661  -0.003  -0.20 0.58 0.737  -0.002  14 
Polio  immunization  rate  1.25 1.40  0.381  0.013  1.36 1.46  0.360  0.015  14 
Mumps immunization rate  9.69  6.55  0.155  0.116    8.32  6.98  0.248  0.100  10 
Rubella  immunization  rate  13.90  10.73  0.212 0.153    8.98  7.28 0.233 0.099  6 
Length of stay (total)  -0.32 0.17 0.063  -0.026  -0.30 0.17 0.081  -0.024  14 
Length of stay (acute care)  -0.16  0.22  0.463  -0.015    -0.14  0.22  0.524  -0.013  10 
Bed occupancy rate  1.91 1.06  0.085  0.026  2.19 0.99  0.039  0.030  9 
Hospital  beds  -0.17 0.19 0.371  -0.021  -0.23 0.19 0.238  -0.028  13 
In-patient admissions  0.44 0.17  0.015  0.027  0.37 0.19  0.061  0.023  14 
Acute care admissions  0.63 0.20  0.004  0.042  0.57 0.21  0.014  0.037  10 
Hospital discharges - infectious  90.63 45.92 0.060  0.110   81.85 49.06 0.108  0.099  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  cancers  25.18 17.38 0.160  0.030   21.68 17.95 0.238  0.026  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  heart  11.65 10.53 0.279  0.017   16.43 10.93 0.145  0.024  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  circulatory  37.40 23.54 0.125  0.019   32.16 26.94 0.244  0.017  13 
Hosp discharges – cerebrov  12.45 6.65 0.073 0.036  12.65 6.75 0.073 0.036  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  respiratory  96.49 60.19 0.121  0.047   86.83 69.61 0.224  0.042  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  digestive  20.08 17.52 0.263  0.012    7.36  18.81 0.699  0.005  13 
Hosp  discharges  –  musculo  17.74 10.60 0.107  0.022   12.93 10.43 0.227  0.016  13 
SDR  appendicitis  -0.04 0.05 0.436  -0.141  -0.05 0.05 0.405  -0.156  13 
SDR hernia & intestinal  -0.16  0.11  0.172  -0.071    -0.18  0.11  0.111  -0.083  13 











Surgical infection rate  -1.32 0.41 0.013  -1.427      -1.38 0.37 0.006  -1.488  3 
Notes: Results refer to the coefficient (Coef) and standard-error (SE, cluster-adjusted) of the SHI dummy variable. Significant at 
5% and 10%. P-values from two-sided t-tests. SHI impact (%) calculated over the average outcome in the corresponding estimating 
sub-sample. In the last column, number of shifts refers to the number of transitions between tax-funded and SHI systems in the sub-
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Table 6: Random trend results: health outcomes, SHI adoption and hospital payment methods 
 
        Hospital Payment Methods 
   SHI dummy  Fee-for-service    Patient-based 
   Dependent variable  Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%)  Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%)     Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%) 
Health expenditures – Total  19.39  22.73 0.048  68.99 29.63 0.170   10.99  20.02  0.027 
Health expenditures – Government  33.49 16.22 0.111  34.55 22.59 0.115    -7.89 30.06 -0.026
Health expenditures – Private  -14.93 15.67 -0.141 36.22 14.55 0.342   19.99  18.88  0.189 




















Physicians 0.03  0.04  0.011  -0.02 0.06  -0.006    0.02  0.04  0.006 
Life  expectancy  -0.35 0.23  -0.005   0.30 0.26 0.004      0.19 0.25 0.003 
Life expectancy (male)  -0.40  0.28  -0.006 0.38  0.35  0.006    0.18  0.29  0.003 
Life expectancy (female)  -0.25  0.16  -0.003 0.16  0.16  0.002    0.19  0.20  0.002 
Under-5  MR  (TransMONEE)  -0.15 0.93  -0.007 0.04 0.90 0.002    0.08 0.65 0.004 
Under-5  MR  (WHO)  0.65  0.74 0.031  0.30 0.88 0.014    0.44 0.93 0.021 
Infant MR (WB)  1.00  0.72  0.089  -0.01 0.52  -0.001    0.00  0.68  0.000 
Infant MR (TransMONEE)  0.14  0.66  0.008  -0.19 0.57  -0.011    0.12  0.53  0.007 
Infant  MR  (WHO)  0.26  0.68 0.016  0.04 0.65 0.003    0.54 0.92 0.033 
Perinatal  MR  0.16  0.49 0.013  0.05 0.46 0.004    0.09 0.72 0.007 
Neonatal  MR  0.17  0.62 0.022  0.53 0.53 0.069    0.54 0.70 0.071 
Postneonatal MR  -0.46  0.28  -0.065 -0.49 0.28 -0.069   0.03  0.29  0.004 
Maternal MR  2.85  2.71  0.099  -0.61 3.71  -0.021    0.32  3.17  0.011 
Maternal MR (3-year)  1.61  1.37  0.055  -1.23 1.41  -0.042    0.56  1.81  0.019 
Caesarean sections  -1.72  1.19  -0.018 -1.91 2.18  -0.020    4.36  3.28  0.046 
SDR all causes  19.89  21.08 0.017  -20.60 18.87  -0.018   -23.74  21.79  -0.021
SDR infeccious diseases  1.13  1.99  0.063 0.18 1.45  0.010  1.12  1.32 0.062 
SDR tuberculosis  1.81  1.57  0.172  -0.34 0.76  -0.033    0.40  0.73  0.038 
SDR diarrhoea (under 5)  1.86  4.48  0.058  4.29  6.40  0.135    -0.88  3.44  -0.028
SDR ARI (under 5)  2.49  6.53  0.023  -5.46 7.39  -0.051    4.13  10.39  0.039 
SDR heart disease  6.21  6.71  0.020  -6.22 9.79  -0.020   -11.47  11.94  -0.038
SDR liver diseases  -0.27  1.24  -0.009 -1.63 1.02  -0.051    1.77  1.45  0.056 
SDR diabetes  1.57  1.05  0.103  -3.46 0.78 -0.228   0.70  1.64  0.046 
SDR circulatory diseases  11.42  13.83 0.018  -6.76 12.61  -0.011   -35.53 17.70 -0.057
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  4.62  4.96  0.026  -2.67 5.64  -0.015   -12.58 6.34 -0.071
SDR neoplasms  2.24  2.54  0.013  0.90  2.45  0.005    -1.59  1.43  -0.009
SDR female breast cancer  0.26  0.44  0.012  -0.28 0.37  -0.013    -0.46  0.40  -0.021
SDR respiratory diseases  3.42  2.49  0.049  -4.22 2.70  -0.061    -0.78  2.41  -0.011
SDR bronchitis  5.27  4.62  0.172  -4.90 2.86 -0.160   -2.07  2.73  -0.067
SDR digestive diseases  -0.30  1.02  -0.006 -0.94 1.11  -0.019    1.88  1.41  0.038 
SDR alcohol causes  -0.17  5.36  -0.001 -5.28 8.24  -0.039    3.35  7.11  0.024 
SDR smoking causes  9.09  16.82 0.017  -7.00 14.22  -0.013   -23.13  13.60  -0.042
Tuberculosis incidence rate  -5.04  4.01  -0.092 4.40 2.47 0.081   7.30  5.17  0.134 
Hepatitis  incidence  rate  15.90 25.59 0.121  20.91 23.52 0.159    30.44 19.17 0.231 
Hepatitis B incidence rate  0.54  1.27  0.033  0.85  0.84  0.051    0.62  0.98  0.038 
Measles incidence rate  -4.93  8.51  -0.412 -3.18 5.26  -0.266    -1.83  5.10  -0.152
Mumps incidence rate  14.19  20.65 0.257  0.50  17.37  0.009   -41.51  49.69  -0.751

















Congenital syph incidence rate  -0.03  0.03  -0.173 0.07 0.04 0.430   -0.08  0.06  -0.486  46
        Hospital Payment Methods 
   SHI dummy  Fee-for-service    Patient-based 
   Dependent variable  Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%)  Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%)     Coef  SE 
Impact 
(%) 
Pertussis incidence rate  1.61  1.39  0.395  -1.01 1.45  -0.248    -1.76 0.82 -0.430
Diphteria incidence rate  -0.23  0.97  -0.152 -0.16 0.88  -0.105    0.54  0.99  0.351 
Tetanus incidence rate  0.01  0.02  0.107  0.03 0.01 0.300   0.00  0.02  0.050 
Cancer incidence rate  -2.42  3.29  -0.010 3.45  3.87  0.014    6.35  4.65  0.026 
Tuberculosis immunization rate  -1.26  1.82  -0.013 2.83  2.22  0.030    6.13  4.26  0.065 
DPT  immunization  rate  -1.82 2.27  -0.020 2.19 2.60 0.024    4.47 4.67 0.048 
Measles  immunization  rate  -0.25 0.84  -0.003 0.03 0.95 0.000    0.01 0.84 0.000 
Polio immunization rate  1.09  1.67  0.012  1.14  1.78  0.012    -0.19  1.35  -0.002
Mumps immunization rate  4.88  6.21  0.059  7.31  6.13  0.088    2.44  7.67  0.030 
Rubella immunization rate  6.88  7.17  0.076    3.83  3.84  0.042     3.15  6.21  0.035 
Length of stay (total)  -0.17  0.18  -0.014 -0.24 0.22  -0.019    -0.27  0.28  -0.021
Length of stay (acute care)  0.06  0.16  0.005  -0.33 0.14 -0.031   -0.36  0.30  -0.033
Bed occupancy rate  2.51 1.12  0.035 0.37 1.43 0.005    -2.23 1.36  -0.031
Hospital beds  -0.11  0.15  -0.014 -0.11 0.18  -0.014    -0.37 0.17 -0.047
In-patient admissions  0.19  0.16  0.012  0.63 0.17 0.040   0.03  0.25  0.002 
Acute care admissions  0.38 0.18  0.025 0.48 0.21 0.031   -0.02  0.31  -0.001
Hospital discharges - infectious  67.22 39.04 0.083  40.35 53.67 0.050    26.03 25.37 0.032 
Hosp discharges - cancers  25.09  23.21 0.031  31.03 36.28  0.039   -46.50  33.94  -0.058
Hosp discharges - heart  3.17  10.82 0.005  32.32 22.66  0.051    23.81  15.62  0.038 
Hosp discharges - circulatory  -42.09 62.89 -0.023 141.61 66.66 0.076   178.95 151.10 0.097 
Hosp discharges - cerebrov  7.94  5.28  0.024  19.05 11.59  0.058    -0.10  7.72  0.000 
Hosp discharges - respiratory  44.61  61.82 0.022  170.54 85.36 0.086   27.25  79.85  0.014 
Hosp discharges - digestive  -17.45 16.98 -0.011 96.63 53.35 0.061   11.42  26.48  0.007 
Hosp discharges - musculo  4.48  10.96 0.006  48.61 25.08 0.064   -12.44  22.35  -0.016
SDR appendicitis  -0.05  0.06  -0.164 -0.04 0.05  -0.126    0.06  0.07  0.202 
SDR hernia & intestinal  -0.16  0.13  -0.071 -0.19 0.11 -0.087   0.10  0.15  0.046 











Surgical infection rate  -1.34 0.46  -1.446   -0.04 0.16  -0.043            
Notes: Results refer to the coefficient (Coef) and standard-error (SE, cluster-adjusted) of the dummies for SHI status, fee-for-
service and patient-based payment methods. Significant at 5% and 10%. The estimated impact (%) of each dummy on a given 
health outcome has been calculated over the average outcome in the corresponding estimating sub-sample.   
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Eqn (2) estimated by OLS   
Random trend model 
Eqn (4) estimated by fixed effects    
Dependent  variable  (log)  Coef  SE p-value    Coef  SE p-value  #  shifts 
Gross wage  0.199 0.076 0.015    0.197 0.067 0.008  6 
Unemployment  0.050 0.050 0.333  0.022 0.056 0.692  7 
Registered  unemployment  0.182 0.198 0.368  0.166 0.182 0.373  11 
Empl-to-pop  –  ILO  -0.007 0.013 0.596  -0.010 0.017 0.581  3 
Empl-to-pop  -  TransMONEE  0.020 0.014 0.170  0.020 0.014 0.172  13 
Informal  economy  0.036 0.099 0.725  -0.002 0.106 0.985  10 
Self-employment  0.040 0.089 0.658  0.018 0.066 0.787  4 
Employment in agriculture  -0.021  0.016  0.220    -0.015  0.017  0.410  9 
Notes: In all models, the natural logarithm of the dependent variable is used. Results refer to the coefficient (Coef) and standard-
error (SE, cluster-adjusted) of the SHI dummy variable. Significant at 5% and 10%. P-values from two-sided t-tests. In the last 
column, number of shifts refers to the number of transitions between tax-funded and SHI systems in the sub-sample used to 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Health sector outcome variables: definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Total health expenditure per 
capita (constant 2000 
international US$) 
Sum of General Government and of Private 
Expenditure on Health. Estimates for this indicator 
were produced by WHO. Data are in constant 
2000 international dollars (deflated using the US 
GDP deflator). 
Own calculations, based 
on the following sources: 
1990-1997: WDI 2002 
database (Serbia and 
Montenegro = 
Yugoslavia, Fed.). From 
1998 onwards: WHO 
estimates, HFA-DB. 
Government health 
expenditure per capita 
(constant 2000 international 
US$) 
General Government Expenditure on Health. 
Estimates for this indicator were produced by 
WHO. Data are in constant 2000 international 
dollars (deflated using the US GDP deflator). 
See above. 
Private health expenditure per 
capita (constant 2000 
international US$) 
Private Expenditure on Health. Estimates for this 
indicator were produced by WHO. Data are in 
constant 2000 international dollars (deflated using 
the US GDP deflator). 
See above. 
Salaries as percentage of total 
government health 
expenditure 
Includes salaries, bonuses to fixed rate wages and 
salaries, and overtime payments to employees in 
the publicly financed health sector. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Physicians (per 1,000 people) Physicians are defined as graduates of any facility 
or school of medicine who are working in the 
country in any medical field (practice, teaching, 
research). 
WDI Database - DDP, 




supplemented by country 
data.  
Life expectancy at birth, in 
years 
Calculated by WHO/EURO for all countries 
which report detailed mortality data to WHO, 
using Wiesler's method. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Life expectancy at birth, in 
years, male 
Calculated by WHO/EURO for all countries 
which report detailed mortality data to WHO, 
using Wiesler's method. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Life expectancy at birth, in 
years, female 
Calculated by WHO/EURO for all countries 
which report detailed mortality data to WHO, 
using Wiesler's method. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1,000) – TransMONEE 
Probability of dying before age 5 years per 1000 
live births, calculated as the number of deaths per 
1000 live births until 5 years of age. 
TransMONEE 2006 
Database, UNICEF IRC, 
Florence. 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 
1,000) – WHO 
See above.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births) - World 
Bank 
Number of infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
Harmonized estimates of the World Health 
Organization, UNICEF, and the World Bank, 
based mainly on household surveys, censuses, and 
vital registration, supplemented by World Bank 
estimates based on household surveys and vital 
registration. 
WDI-DDP database.   57
Variable Definition  Source 
Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births) – 
TransMONEE 
Number of infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1,000 live births in a given year. 
TransMONEE 2006 
Database, UNICEF IRC, 
Florence. 
Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births) - WHO 
See above.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Perinatal mortality rate (per 
1,000 births) 
Weight specific (1000 g +) fetal deaths and early 
neonatal deaths per 1000 births (live 
births+stillbirths) 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Neonatal mortality rate (per 
1,000 live births) 
Number of deaths in infants under 28 days of age 
in a year, per 1000 live births in that year (ICD-
10). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Postneonatal mortality rate 
(per 1,000 live births) 
Number of deaths in infants between 4 weeks and 
a year of age in a year, per 1000 live births in that 
year (ICD-10).  
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Maternal mortality rate (per 
100,000 live births) 
Maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. A 
maternal death is death of a woman while 
pregnant or within 42 days of termination of 
pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of 
the pregnancy, from any cause related to or 
aggravated by the pregnancy or its management, 
but not from accidental or incidental causes. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Maternal mortality rate (per 
100,000 live births) - moving 
average (3 years) 
Moving average (3 years) of maternal deaths per 
100,000 live births. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Caesarean sections (per 1,000 
live births) 
Number of caesarean sections per 1000 live births. WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, all causes (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, all causes, all ages, per 
100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, infectious diseases 
(per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, infectious and parasitic 
diseases, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, tuberculosis (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, tuberculosis, all ages, per 
100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, diarrhoeal 
diseases, under five years (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, diarrhoeal diseases, under 
5 years per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, ARI, under five 
years (per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, acute respiratory 
infections, under 5 years per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, ischaemic heart 
disease (per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, ischaemic heart disease, 
all ages per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, liver diseases (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, chronic liver disease and 
cirrhosis, all ages per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, diabetes (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, diabetes, all ages, per 
100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, circulatory 
diseases (per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, diseases of circulatory 
system, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, cerebrovascular 
diseases (per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, cerebrovascular diseases, 
all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, neoplasms (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, malignant neoplasms, all 
ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB.   58
Variable Definition  Source 
Death rate, breast cancer (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, malignant neoplasm 
female breast, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, respiratory 
diseases (per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, diseases of the respiratory 





Standardized death rate, 
bronchitis/emphysema/asthma, all ages, per 
100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, digestive diseases 
(per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, diseases of the digestive 
system, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, alcohol causes 
(per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, selected alcohol related 
causes, per 100,000. The mortality from 
combined, selected causes of death which are 
known from literature to be related to alcohol 
consumption. Includes: cancer of oesophagus and 
larynx; alcohol dependence syndrom; chronic liver 
disease and cirrhosis; all external causes. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, smoking causes 
(per 100,000) 
Standardized death rate, selected smoking related 
causes, per 100,000. The mortality from 
combined, selected causes of death which are 
known from literature to be related to smoking. 
Includes: cancers of mouth and pharynx, larynx, 
traxea, bronchus, lung and oesophagus; ischaemic 
heart disease; cerebrovascular diseases; chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Tuberculosis incidence rate 
(per 100,000) 
Tuberculosis incidence per 100,000. Number of 
newly diagnosed tuberculosis cases, all forms 
(ICD-9:010- 
 018; ICD-10: A15-A19) during the given 
calendar year. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hepatitis incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Viral hepatitis incidence per 100,000.   WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hepatitis B incidence rate 
(per 100,000) 
Viral hepatitis B incidence per 100,000.   WHO, HFA-DB. 
Measles incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Measles incidence per 100,000.   WHO, HFA-DB. 
Mumps incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Mumps incidence per 100,000.   WHO, HFA-DB. 
Syphilis incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Syphilis incidence per 100,000.   WHO, HFA-DB. 
Congenital syphilis incidence 
rate (per 100,000) 
Congenital syphilis incidence per 100,000.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Pertussis incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Pertussis incidence per 100,000.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Diphteria incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Diphteria incidence per 100,000.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Tetanus incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Tetanus incidence per 100,000.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Cancer incidence rate (per 
100,000) 
Cancer incidence per 100,000. Number of patients 
with newly diagnosed cancer during given 
calendar year. 
WHO, HFA-DB.   59
Variable Definition  Source 
Immunization rate, 
tuberculosis, infants (%) 
Percentage of infants reaching their first birthday 
in the given calendar year who have been fully 
vaccinated against tuberculosis (BCG, 1 dose). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Immunization rate, DPT, 
infants (%) 
Percentage of children under 2 immunized against 
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus. 
TransMONEE 2006 
Database, UNICEF IRC, 
Florence. 
Immunization rate, measles, 
infants (%) 
Percentage of children reaching their second 
birthday who have been fully vaccinated against 
measles (1 dose). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Immunization rate, 
poliomyelitis, infants (%) 
Percentage of infants reaching their first birthday 
in the given calendar year who have been fully 
vaccinated against poliomyelitis (3 doses).  
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Immunization rate, mumps, 
infants (%) 
Percentage of infants reaching their second 
birthday in the given calendar year who have been 
fully vaccinated against mumps. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Immunization rate, rubella, 
infants (%) 
Percentage of infants reaching their second 
birthday in the given calendar year who have been 
fully vaccinated against rubella. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Average length of stay, all 
hospitals 
Total number of occupied hospital bed-days of all 
hospitals divided by the total number of 
admissions or discharges in those hospitals. 
Length of stay (LOS) of one patient = date of 
discharge - date of admission. If these are the 
same dates, then LOS is set to one day. Bed-days 
of newborns are excluded in the calculation. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Average length of stay, acute 
care hospitals only 
Total number of occupied hospital bed-days of 
short-stay hospitals divided by the total number of 
admissions or discharges in those hospitals. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Bed occupancy rate (%), 
acute care hospitals only 
Average number of days when hospital bed was 
occupied as percentage of available 365 days. 
Calculation: utilized bed-days x 100/available 
bed-days during the calendar year. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital beds (per 1,000 
people) 
Hospital beds include in-patient beds available in 
public, private, general, and specialized hospitals 
and rehabilitation centers. In most cases beds for 
both acute and chronic care are included. 
WDI Database - DDP, 




supplemented by country 
data.  
In-patient care admissions 
(per 100) 
Admission is the hospitalization of a patient in an 
in-patient facility normally involving a stay of at 
least 24 hours. In the case of death or discharge to 
another health establishment, the actual stay may 
be shorter than 24 hours. These cases are 
registered as a one-day hospitalization. The 
number of admissions excludes: a transfer from 
one department to  another one at the same 
hospital; day-cases of day patients; weekend leave 
when the patient has been released temporarily 
and the hospital bed is still reserved; cases where 
treatment is provided by hospital personnel at the 
patient's home. Newborns are not included. 
WHO, HFA-DB.   60
Variable Definition  Source 
Acute care hospital 
admissions (per 100) 
Same as above, short stay hospitals only.  WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, 
infectious and parasitic 
diseases (per 100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
infectious and parasitic diseases (Chapter I of 
ICD-9/10). Discharge is the conclusion of a period 
of in-patient care, whether the patient returned to 
his home, was transferred to another in-patient 
facility or died. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, all 
cancers (per 100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
cancers (Chapter II of ICD-9/10). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, 
ischaemic heart disease (per 
100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
ischaemic heart diseases (ICD-10: I20-I25). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, 
circulatory system diseases 
(per 100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 




cerebrovascular diseases (per 
100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
cerebrovascular diseases (ICD-10: I60-I69). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, 
respiratory diseases (per 
100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
respiratory diseases (Chapter X of ICD-10). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, digestive 
system diseases (per 100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
digestive system diseases (Chapter XI of ICD-10).
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Hospital discharges, 
musculoskeletal system and 
connective tissue diseases 
(per 100,000) 
Total number of patients discharged from all 
hospitals during the given calendar year with the 
principal diagnosis falling into the group of 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue 
diseases (Chapter XIII of ICD-10). 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, appendicitis (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, appendicitis, all ages, per 
100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, hernia and 
intestinal obstruction (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, hernia and intestinal 
obstruction, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Death rate, adverse effects of 
therapeutic agents (per 
100,000) 
Standardized death rate, adverse effects of 
therapeutic agents, all ages, per 100,000. 
WHO, HFA-DB. 
Surgical infection rate, all 
operations (%) 
Average rate of in-patient surgical operations in 
all hospitals with postoperative surgical wound 
infection during the given calendar year (ICD-10: 
WHO, HFA-DB.   61
Variable Definition  Source 
T81.4) 
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Table 10: Labor sector outcome variables: definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Average wage rate, gross 
(constant 2000 
international dollars) 
Total annual gross wages and salaries in constant 
PPP averages for the employed population aged 15-
59. 
Own calculations based on 
data from WB-WDI and 
TransMONEE databases. 
Unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) 
Share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment. National 
rates based on labor force sample surveys. 
ILO - LABORSTA, KILM 
database.   
Registered 
unemployment, total (% 
of total labor force) 
Number of persons looking for work who are 
entered on the registers at the end of each month. 
ILO - LABORSTA, KILM 
database.   
Employment-to-
population ratio (%) - ILO 
Proportion of a country's working-age population 
that is employed. Original sources are labor force 
surveys and official estimates available mainly at 
LABORSTA and OECD. 
ILO - LABORSTA, KILM 
database.   
Employment-to-
population ratio (%) - 
TransMONEE 
Number of employed as per cent of population aged 
15-59. Original sources are labor force surveys, ILO 
and CIS Stat. 
TransMONEE 2006 
Database, UNICEF IRC, 
Florence. 
Informal economy as a 
share of the total GDP (%) 
- Own calculations 
Informal GDP as a percentage of the total (formal + 
informal) GDP. Annual estimates are based on the 
growth rate of the national electricity output as a 
proxy for total GDP growth, which are compared to 
the growth rate of the official (measured) GDP to 
give an estimate of the evolution of the size of the 
informal economy. 
Own calculations based on 
initial values for the size of 
the informal economy 
provided by Johnson et al. 
(1997) and WDI-WB 
database. 
Self-employment (% of 
total employment) 
Self-employed individuals as a share of total 
employment. The self-employed category is defined 
as those individuals who are either own-account 
workers (a person who operates his or her own 
economic enterprise, or engages independently in a 
profession or trade, and hires no employees) or 
members of producers' cooperatives (a person who 
is an active member of a producers’ cooperative, 
regardless of the industry in which it is established).
ILO - LABORSTA, KILM 
database.   
Employment in 
agriculture (% of total 
employment) 
Number of employees working in the agricultural 
sector as a share of total employment. Employees 
are people who work for a public or private 
employer and receive remuneration in wages, 
salary, commission, tips, piece rates, or pay in kind.
ILO - LABORSTA, KILM 
database.   
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Table 11: Covariates included in the X-vector: definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
GDP per capita (constant 
2000 international 
dollars) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). 
Data are in constant 2000 international dollars (deflated 
using the US GDP deflator). 
WB-WDI 
Database. 
Population ages 65 and 
above (% of total)* 
Percentage of the total population that is 65 or older.   WB-WDI 
Database. 
Urban population (% of 
total)* 
Urban population is the midyear population of areas 




* Excluded from labor models. 
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Table 12: Classification of hospital payment methods in the dataset 
 
Hospital Payment Methods 
Country SHI  adoption  Predominant method Years 
Values assumed by the 
corresponding dummies in the 
dataset 
Albania  1995  B     B=1 throughout 
Armenia   Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Azerbaijan   Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Belarus   Never  ?     all missing 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Prior to 1990  B     B=1 throughout 
Bulgaria  1999  B  Until 1998  B=1 (until 1998) 
      PBP  1999 onwards PBP=1 (1999 onwards) 
Croatia  Prior to 1990  B  Until 1992  B=1 (until 1992) 
      FFS  1993 onwards FFS=1 (1993 onwards) 
Czech Republic  1993  B  Until 1992  B=1 (until 1992) 
   FFS  1993-1997  FFS=1  (1993-1997) 
      B  1998 onwards B=1 (1998 onwards) 
Estonia  1992  B  Until 1991  B=1 (until 1991) 
    FFS  Until 2003  FFS=1 (1992-2003) 
      PBP  2004 onwards PBP=1 (2004 onwards) 
Georgia  1995  B  Until 1995  B=1 (until 1995) 
      PBP  1996 onwards PBP=1 (1996 onwards) 
Hungary  1990  B  Until 1992  B=1 (until 1992) 
      PBP  1993 onwards PBP=1 (1993 onwards) 
Kazakhstan  1996 (scrapped 1998)  B  Until 1995  B=1 (until 1995) 
    PBP  1996 onwards PBP=1 (1996 onwards) 
Kyrgyz Republic  1997  B  Until 1996  B=1 (until 1996) 
      PBP  1997 onwards PBP=1 (1997 onwards) 
Latvia  Never  B  Until 1993  B=1 (until 1993) 
   FFS  1994-1997  FFS=1  (1994-1997) 
      PBP  1998 onwards PBP=1 (1998 onwards) 
Lithuania  1991  B  Until 1993  B=1 (until 1993) 
      PBP  1994 onwards PBP=1 (1994 onwards) 
Macedonia, FYR  1991  B  Until 1990  B=1 (until 1990) 
      FFS  1991 onwards FFS (1991 onwards) 
Moldova  Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Poland  Never  B  Until 1998  B=1 (until 1998) 
      PBP  1999 onwards PBP=1 (1999 onwards) 
Romania  1998  B     B=1 throughout 
Russian Federation  1993  B     B=1 throughout 
Serbia and Montenegro   Prior to 1990  ?     all missing 
Slovak Republic  1995  B  Until 1993   B=1 (until 1993) 
   FFS  1994-1998  FFS=1  (1994-1998) 
   B  1999-2001  B=1  (1999-2001) 
      PBP  2002 onwards PBP=1 (2002 onwards) 
Slovenia  1992  B   Until 1991   B=1 (until 1991) 
      PBP   1992 onwards PBP=1 (1992 onwards) 
Tajikistan   Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Turkey   Prior to 1990  B     B=1 throughout 
Turkmenistan   Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Ukraine   Never  B     B=1 throughout   65
Hospital Payment Methods 
Country SHI  adoption  Predominant method Years 
Values assumed by the 
corresponding dummies in the 
dataset 
Uzbekistan  Never  B     B=1 throughout 
Notes: B = fixed budget/block grants; FFS = fee-for-service/payment by bed days; PBP = patient-based payment method. 
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